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D A N I E L L E  K E A T S  C I T R O N  
Sexual Privacy 
abstract.  Those who wish to control, expose, and damage the identities of individuals rou-
tinely do so by invading their privacy. People are secretly recorded in bedrooms and public bath-
rooms and “up their skirts.” Such images are used to coerce people into sharing nude photographs 
and filming sex acts under the threat of public disclosure. People’s nude images are posted online 
without permission. Machine-learning technology is used to create digitally manipulated “deep 
fake” sex videos that swap people’s faces into pornography. 
 Each of these abuses is an invasion of sexual privacy—the behaviors, expectations, and choices 
that manage access to and information about the human body, sex, sexuality, gender, and intimate 
activities. Most often, women, nonwhites, sexual minorities, and minors shoulder the abuse. Sex-
ual privacy, this Article contends, is a distinct privacy interest that warrants recognition and pro-
tection. It serves as a cornerstone for sexual autonomy and consent. It is foundational to human 
dignity and intimacy, and its denial results in the subordination of marginalized communities. 
 Traditional privacy law is increasingly insufficient to protect this interest. Its efficacy is erod-
ing just as digital technologies magnify the scale and scope of the harm. The Article suggests a new 
approach to protecting sexual privacy that focuses on law and markets. Law should provide federal 
and state penalties for all types of sexual-privacy invasions, remove the statutory immunity from 
liability for certain content platforms, and work in tandem with hate-crime laws. Market efforts 
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introduction 
The barriers that protect information about our intimate lives are under as-
sault. Networked technologies are exploited to surveil and expose individuals’ 
naked bodies and intimate activities. Home devices are used to spy on intimates 
and ex-intimates.
1
 Hidden cameras film people in bedrooms and restrooms, and 
“up their skirts” without permission. People are coerced into sharing nude im-
ages and making sex videos under threat of public disclosure.
2
 Sexually explicit 
images are posted online without their subjects’ permission.
3
 Technology ena-




At the heart of each of these abuses is an invasion of sexual privacy—the so-
cial norms (behaviors, expectations, and decisions) that govern access to, and 
information about, individuals’ intimate lives. Sexual privacy concerns the con-
cealment of naked bodies and intimate activities including, but not limited to, 
sexual intercourse. It involves personal decisions about intimate life, such as 
whether to entrust others with information about one’s sexuality or gender, or 
whether to expose one’s body to others. As I am using the term, sexual privacy 
is both descriptive and normative. It concerns how the social norms surrounding 
individuals’ intimate lives are currently experienced and how they should be ex-
perienced. 
Sexual privacy sits at the apex of privacy values because of its importance to 
sexual agency, intimacy, and equality.
5
 We are free only insofar as we can manage 
the boundaries around our bodies and intimate activities. With sexual privacy, 
 
1. See, e.g., Nellie Bowles, Thermostats, Locks and Lights: Digital Tools of Domestic Abuse, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/23/technology/smart-home 
-devices-domestic-abuse.html [https://perma.cc/8KCM-NACX]. 
2. See Benjamin Wittes et al., Sextortion: Cybersecurity, Teenagers, and Remote Sexual Assault, 
BROOKINGS (May 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/05 
/sextortion1-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/JT5H-MCJG]. 
3. See Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 345, 346 (2014). 
4. See Robert Chesney & Danielle Keats Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, De-
mocracy, and National Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), https://ssrn.com 
/abstract=3213954. 
5. See David E. Pozen, Privacy-Privacy Tradeoffs, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 221 (2016) (calling for scholars 
to distinguish the value of different privacy interests so that policy makers can make mean-
ingful decisions when privacy interests are in conflict). 
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we can experiment with our bodies, our sexuality, and our gender.
6
 We can au-
thor our intimate lives and be seen as whole human beings rather than as just 
our intimate parts or innermost sexual fantasies.
7
 
Without sexual privacy, we have difficulty forming intimate relationships. 
We develop relationships of love and caring through a process of mutual self-
disclosure and vulnerability.
8
 Partners reveal their innermost selves to one other 
with the expectation that they will protect each other’s intimate information.
9
 




Equal opportunity is on the line as well. Women and individuals from mar-
ginalized communities shoulder the brunt of the abuse.
11
 They suffer stigmati-
zation in the wake of sexual-privacy invasions.
12
 They lose their jobs and have 
difficulty finding new ones.
13
 They feel humiliated and ashamed. Sexual-privacy 
violations deny them the ability to enjoy life’s crucial opportunities. 
Despite sexual privacy’s importance, reforms have proceeded slowly. This is 
partly because we lack a clear conception of what sexual privacy is and the harms 
wrought by its invasion. Policy makers and companies have addressed particular 
abuses only in isolation. One day, the discussion centers on nonconsensual por-
nography; the next, it centers on sextortion; and so on. Because the full breadth 
of the harm is not in view, policy makers fail to realize the costs of these viola-
tions. 
Social attitudes have also stymied reform efforts. Some contend that sexual 
privacy merits no attention because sexual-privacy invasions involve problems 
 
6. CHARLES FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES 140 (1970). 
7. See, e.g., JANET MOCK, REDEFINING REALNESS: MY PATH TO WOMANHOOD, IDENTITY, LOVE & 
SO MUCH MORE (2014); JENNIFER FINNEY BOYLAN, SHE’S NOT THERE: A LIFE IN TWO GEN-
DERS (2003); Linda C. McClain, Inviolability and Privacy: The Castle, the Sanctuary, and the 
Body, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 195, 241 (1995). 
8. IRWIN ALTMAN & DALMAS TAYLOR, SOCIAL PENETRATION: THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERPER-
SONAL RELATIONSHIPS (1973). 
9. EDWARD J. BLOUSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP PRIVACY 181 (1978). (“Lovers fashion intimacy 
by telling each other things about themselves that they would not share with anyone else.”). 
10. FRIED, supra note 6, at 140. 
11. Scott Skinner-Thompson, Performative Privacy, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1673 (2017) [hereinafter 
Skinner-Thompson, Performative Privacy]; Scott Skinner-Thompson, Privacy’s Double Stand-
ards, 93 WASH. L. REV. 2051 (2018) (explaining that marginalized communities are dispropor-
tionately subject to unwanted surveillance) [hereinafter Skinner-Thompson, Privacy’s Double 
Standards]. 
12. DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 6 (2014). 
13. Id. 




 Others warn that efforts to protect sexual privacy reinforce 
outmoded views of sexual modesty and shame
15
 or that sexual privacy would 
simply hide the abuse of the vulnerable.
16
 
Yet sexual privacy need not work this way.
17
 A comprehensive account of 
sexual privacy would bring into view the full breadth of the harm inflicted by its 
invasion. It would allow us to appreciate the true nature of social attitudes dis-
missing sexual privacy as unimportant. Saying that victims “asked for it” is just 
another way that society has long trivialized harms suffered by people from mar-
ginalized communities.
18
 Far from re-inscribing shame, the identification and 
protection of sexual privacy would affirm people’s ability to manage the bound-
aries of their intimate lives. It would convey respect for individuals’ choices 
about whom they entrust with their bodies and intimate information. 
But would the protection of sexual privacy inevitably conceal abuse of the 
vulnerable? Past need not be prologue. Courts once immunized male batterers 
 
14. Id. at 6-8; Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment, 
108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 392-95 (2009) (exploring recurring patterns animating society’s triv-
ialization of harms disproportionately impacting women, such as domestic abuse, workplace 
sexual harassment, and cyber gender harassment); Citron & Franks, supra note 3. 
15. JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM (2006). 
This critique has early tort-law bona fides. Late nineteenth-century privacy-tort judicial deci-
sions reflected “paternalistic attempts to keep ‘ladies’ out of the public gaze.” JESSICA LAKE, 
THE FACE THAT LAUNCHED A THOUSAND LAWSUITS: THE AMERICAN WOMEN WHO FORGED A 
RIGHT TO PRIVACY 225 (2016). This argument is one I consistently faced when presenting 
work coauthored with Mary Anne Franks on nonconsensual pornography. Some feminist 
scholars criticized our call to criminalize the nonconsensual posting of a person’s nude images 
as affirming the view that women should be ashamed of their nude bodies. But the punish-
ment of nonconsensual pornography would not reinscribe shame. Instead, it would make 
clear that each and every one of us should be able to decide who gets to view our naked bodies. 
16. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND THE LAW 93, 
101-02 (1987); Reva B. Siegel, ‘The Rule of Love:’ Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 
YALE L.J. 2117 (1996). Sexual privacy should not be abandoned for fear of its invocation to 
coerce silence or hide abuse, whether domestic abuse or sexual predation—as in the recent 
cases of Harvey Weinstein, Charlie Rose, and Matt Lauer. Instead, sexual privacy warrants 
protection when it affirms autonomy, enables intimacy, and secures equality for all involved. 
See infra Part I. 
17. In this Article, I emulate the spirit of Anita Allen’s scholarship, which has sought to identify 
beneficial forms of privacy and private choice to which women and minorities can lay claim, 
see, e.g., ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS (1988) [hereinafter ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS]; Anita 
L. Allen, Gender and Privacy in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1175 (2000); Anita L. Allen & Erin 
Mack, How Privacy Got Its Gender, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 441, 442 (1990), as well as Linda 
McClain’s scholarship, which has called for an “egalitarian, liberal feminist conception of pri-
vacy,” Linda C. McClain, Reconstructive Tasks for a Liberal Feminist Conception of Privacy, 40 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 759, 760 (1999); see also McClain, supra note 7. 
18. See Citron, supra note 14, at 392-95. 
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from assault law in the name of “family privacy.”
19
 Missing from this privacy 
calculus was the invasion of battered women’s sexual privacy. In the home, bat-
tered women were subject to unwanted inspection, exhibition, and abuse. Their 
bodies were not their own
20
—society protected male batterers’ privacy interests 
at the expense of battered women’s sexual privacy.
21
 Courts should have consid-
ered the sexual-privacy interests of all the parties involved—including women in 
the home. Today, law and society must take full account of all individuals’ pri-
vacy interests, with a clear understanding of sexual privacy’s distinct importance. 
Now is the time to conceptualize sexual privacy clearly and to commit to pro-
tecting it explicitly. Traditional privacy law’s efficacy is eroding as digital tech-
nologies magnify the scale and scope of the harm. Thanks to networked tech-
nologies, sexual privacy can be invaded at scale and from across the globe.
22
 
Search engines make the fruits of privacy violations easily accessible,
23
 and in 
some cases, the damage can be permanent.
24
 But neither tort law nor criminal 
law has protected sexual privacy as clearly or as comprehensively as it should.
25
 
Some victims are left with little or no legal redress, while abusers are punished 
in an inconsistent manner. For instance, neither criminal laws nor the privacy 
torts are likely to cover up-skirt photos, and the criminal law’s coverage of sex-
tortion turns on the victim’s age.
26
 
This Article charts out the meaning of sexual privacy as a distinct concept 
and describes its value to individuals, groups, and society. It contends that sexual 
privacy warrants recognition and protection as a foundational privacy interest. 
The Article suggests a path for reform that would fill gaps in the existing pro-
tections that have enabled a culture of impunity. In particular, the Article focuses 
on sexual-privacy invasions at the hands of private individuals, leaving discus-




19. Siegel, supra note 16, at 2118. 
20. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 17, at 54-81. 
21. Id. at 58-59; Siegel, supra note 16, at 2122-34. 
22. Brian Krebs, Sextortion Scam Uses Recipient’s Hacked Passwords, KREBS ON SECURITY (July 18, 
2018), https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/07/sextortion-scam-uses-recipients-hacked 
-passwords [https://perma.cc/D78D-KUJ8]. 
23. Cf. CITRON, supra note 12, at 67 (explaining that popular posts, even if inflammatory, increase 
web-page traffic). 
24. See Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1804, 1813-14 (2010). 
25. See infra Part III. 
26. Wittes et al., supra note 2, at 26. 
27. However, this Article does refer to state invasions of sexual privacy in order to provide context 
for its focus on individual wrongdoing and law’s role in addressing it. My future work will 
explore governmental and corporate practices affecting sexual privacy. For instance, it will 
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Why concentrate on interpersonal wrongdoing? Current laws already address 
some interpersonal sexual-privacy invasions—no doubt because the harm suf-
fered is viscerally palpable—and so provide a foothold to assess the existing legal 
protections of and norms concerning sexual privacy. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I charts out the concept of sexual 
privacy—its descriptive meaning, normative significance, and interests pro-
tected. The values that sexual privacy protects—autonomy, intimacy, and equal-
ity—offer criteria for identifying sexual-privacy interests, thus allowing policy 
makers and courts to focus their efforts. This Part provides guidance for how to 
make inevitable trade-offs when sexual-privacy interests clash with other privacy 
interests. 
Part II highlights sexual-privacy invasions in the past and the present. 
Women and marginalized communities have disproportionately experienced 
these invasions throughout history. In the past, law and norms forced the expo-
sure of enslaved black men and women’s bodies. Middle- and upper-class white 
women enjoyed little sexual privacy in the home. For far too long, sexual minor-
ities could not expect privacy in bedrooms and public bathrooms. Today, in the 
digital age, sexual-privacy invasions have taken new forms, including video voy-
eurism, up-skirt and down-blouse photos, sextortion, nonconsensual pornogra-
phy, and deep-fake sex videos. As this Part shows, sexual-privacy invasions in-
flict profound harm, impacting nearly every aspect of people’s lives. 
Part III considers possible legal and market responses to sexual-privacy in-
vasions. Existing criminal and civil laws are deficient. Far too many sexual-pri-
vacy invasions are misdemeanors that law enforcement ignores or that are sub-
ject to no penalty. Some victims may bring civil suits against their attackers, but 
privacy law fails to provide meaningful redress when perpetrators are judgment 
proof. The parties best situated to minimize the harm—online platforms—have 
no legal incentives to intervene because they enjoy broad immunity from liabil-
ity, even for sexual-privacy invasions that they enable and encourage. Federal 
and state law should instead prohibit all manner of sexual-privacy invasions, en-
hance penalties for bias-motivated invasions, and remove the immunities en-
joyed by certain content platforms. Privacy-tort law should be interpreted to 
provide meaningful redress for sexual-privacy invasions. Of course, law can only 
 
consider governmental outing of people’s sexuality, gender identity, and HIV status; state 
laws requiring people to frequent bathrooms that accord with the sex assigned on their birth 
certificates; state denial of services to transgender individuals; the mandatory collection of 
intimate information to obtain government services; and the use of automated predictions 
about our intimate lives among other issues. Scholars have already drawn attention to these 
issues, and my later work will build on their important insights. See, e.g., KHIARA M. BRIDGES, 
THE POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS (2017); Scott Skinner-Thompson, Outing Privacy, 110 NW. 
U. L. REV. 159 (2015); Kendra Albert, The Double Binds of Transgender Privacy (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
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do so much, and legal overreach has costs. Market mechanisms therefore offer 
another avenue for reform. Some tech companies have come to see that sexual-
privacy invasions are bad for business. Accordingly, they have implemented pro-
jects aimed at cabining the harm that victims suffer. The Part concludes by as-
sessing the impact of those developments on individuals, groups, and society. 
i .  sexual privacy 
A. Understanding the Concept of Sexual Privacy 
In everyday interactions, we construct boundaries around our personal in-
formation, bodies, and activities.
28
 We seclude some physical spaces but not oth-
ers. We keep some conversations confidential and share others with third par-
ties.
29
 We make social-media posts visible to some and hide them from others.
30
 
Sometimes, law protects the boundaries that free us from scrutiny and expo-
sure. Consider a few well-known examples. Law restricts access to personal data 
held in certain government databases.
31
 It limits the collection, use, and disclo-




 social security numbers,
34
 
and driver’s license numbers.
35
 It protects the privacy of political activities—our 




28. IRWIN ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: PRIVACY, PERSONAL SPACE, TER-
RITORY, AND CROWDING 50 (1975); Kirsty Hughes, A Behavioural Understanding of Privacy and 
Its Implications for Privacy Law, 75 MOD. L. REV. 806, 810-13 (2012). 
29. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 104 (2008) (offering a taxonomy of sixteen types 
of privacy problems, including intrusion, disclosure, interrogation, use, and breach of confi-
dentiality). 
30. See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic D. Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1 (2013) (stating that social-media users use privacy settings in order to attain their 
desired level of obscurity). 
31. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2018); see PRISCILLA REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY 71-90 
(1995). 
32. Cf. Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk & Anxiety: A Theory of Data Breach Harms, 
96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 748-53 (2018) (discussing the various harms that are cognizable in data 
breaches). 
33. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2018); 34 C.F.R. § 99 (2018). 
34. Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law at the Dawn 
of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 248-49, 255-57 (2007). 
35. See Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (2018). 
36. Jill Lepore, Rock, Paper, Scissors: How We Used to Vote, NEW YORKER, Oct. 13, 2008, at 90 (de-
scribing the historical development toward a “secret ballot”). In the landmark decision of 
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), the Court struck down an Alabama 
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At other times, law does not protect privacy even though it should. Whether 
privacy is warranted depends upon the settings, contexts, and expectations in 
which boundaries are erected.
37
 Those settings, contexts, and expectations may 
involve sex—the human body; intimate activities (including, but not limited to, 
sexual intercourse); personal information about sex, sexuality, and gender (in-
cluding, but not limited to, thoughts, fantasies, and desires); and personal 
choices about the body and intimate information.
38
 
Sexual privacy concerns the social norms governing the management of 
boundaries around intimate life. It involves the extent to which others have ac-
cess to and information about people’s naked bodies (notably the parts of the 
body associated with sex and gender); their sexual desires, fantasies, and 
thoughts; communications related to their sex, sexuality, and gender; and inti-
mate activities (including, but not limited, to sexual intercourse). 
Sexual privacy thus captures many things at once. It refers to expectations 
concerning the seclusion of physical spaces where people have sex and undress, 
such as bedrooms, dressing rooms, and restrooms. It concerns assumptions 
about the concealment of genitalia, buttocks, and female breasts in varied con-
texts, including the street and the home. It involves the presumed confidentiality 
of communications with intimates about sex, sexual orientation, gender, sexual 
fantasies, or sexual experiences. It concerns expectations about the decision to 
 
law requiring the disclosure of members of the civil rights group on First Amendment 
grounds. Thanks to Nestor Davidson for urging me to include this point. 
37. SOLOVE, supra note 29, at 44-46. Privacy has been studied from a wide range of perspectives, 
across disciplines. See, e.g., JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF (2012) (cri-
tiquing neoliberal approaches to privacy and copyright concerns and offering a theory of play 
and human flourishing to understand and address them); WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S 
BLUEPRINT (2018) (evaluating privacy from a design perspective); ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE 
ASSAULT ON PRIVACY (1971) (exploring privacy from an individual-liberties perspective); RE-
GAN, supra note 31; NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY (2015); ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRI-
VACY AS TRUST (2018) (putting forth a framework highlighting “trust” as the animating prin-
ciple behind privacy protections); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 
VAND. L. REV. 1609 (1999). Some scholars have searched for a common denominator for pri-
vacy. See, e.g., ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967). Other scholars reject the notion 
that privacy has a singular purpose and instead focus on privacy’s value in various contexts. 
See HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF 
SOCIAL LIFE (2009) (offering a theory of “contextual integrity” in which contextual norms 
shape privacy protection); SOLOVE, supra note 29 (arguing that privacy should be understood 
as a family of interrelated problems). In this Article, I take a “ground up” approach in explor-
ing how sexual privacy is and should be experienced in particular contexts and settings. 
38. See, e.g., PATRICIA BOLING, PRIVACY AND THE POLITICS OF INTIMATE LIFE 57 (1996). In this 
book, Boling explores how privacy functions, focusing on the Supreme Court’s decisional-
privacy opinions, such as Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973); and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
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share one’s nude body with others. While sexual privacy involves various activ-
ities, decisions, communications, thoughts, and information, the concept’s con-
nective tissue and conceptual core is intimate life. 
B. Highlighting Sexual Privacy’s Value 
Sexual privacy implicates a “different domain[] of value” from many other 
privacy interests.
39
 In the hierarchy of privacy values, it is among the most sig-
nificant to individuals, groups, and society. It therefore deserves recognition and 
protection, in the same way that health privacy, financial privacy, communica-




Scholars have already recognized that sexual privacy is a valuable category 
that deserves special protection.
41
 Anita Allen has demonstrated the significance 
of sexual privacy for women
42
 and LGBTQ individuals.
43
 Linda McClain has 
highlighted the importance of women’s liberty for making decisions about their 
 
39. Pozen, supra note 5, at 231. 
40. See WILLIAM MCGEVERAN, PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION LAW 302-22, 731-883 (2016) (dis-
cussing cases and statutes providing special protection for children’s personal information 
collected online, health data, financial records, credit reports, electronic communications, and 
educational records); Citron, supra note 34 (arguing that certain personal information like 
biometric data and Social Security numbers poses acute risks of identity theft and other forms 
of fraud and that its disclosure warrants strict liability akin to that for ultrahazardous activi-
ties); Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1153-54 (2015) (including sex 
in a list of the kinds of information that count as sensitive). Neil Richards powerfully and 
convincingly contends that our intellectual activities deserve special recognition and protec-
tion. See RICHARDS, supra note 37, at 95-108. 
41. For my early thoughts on the issues at the heart of this piece, see Danielle Citron, Protecting 
Sexual Privacy in the Information Age, in PRIVACY IN THE MODERN AGE: THE SEARCH FOR 
SOLUTIONS 46 (Marc Rotenberg et al. eds., 2015); and Danielle Citron, Protecting Sexual Pri-
vacy with Law, FORBES (Apr. 16, 2014, 10:42 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites 
/daniellecitron/2014/04/16/protecting-sexual-privacy-with-law [https://perma.cc/6FB2 
-NZ4T]. 
42. See, e.g., ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 17. For instance, Allen described workplace sexual 
harassment as a matter of sexual privacy. When male supervisors stared at female employees’ 
breasts and tried to grope them, they invaded the employees’ ability to keep their sexual iden-
tities in the background. Id. at 128-29. They pierced their sexual anonymity and forced the 
exhibition of their sexuality. Id. 
43. See Anita L. Allen, Privacy Torts: Unreliable Remedies for LGBT Plaintiffs, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1711, 
1721 (2010). 




 Khiara Bridges has shown that poor mothers need freedom from inva-
sive state interrogations about their intimate histories in order to protect their 
dignity and equal citizenship.
45
 Mary Anne Franks has explored the importance 
of privacy for marginalized communities and the disparate impact that noncon-
sensual pornography has on women, sexual minorities, and nonwhites.
46
 
This Section underscores sexual privacy’s value for sexual autonomy, iden-
tity development, and intimate relationships. It highlights the relationship be-
tween sexual privacy and equality and the intersectionality of sexual-privacy in-
vasions. 
1. Sexual Privacy as Securing Autonomy 
Sexual privacy is foundational for the exercise of human agency and sexual 
autonomy. It enables individuals to set the boundaries of their intimate lives.
47
 
With sexual privacy, individuals determine the contexts in which their naked 
bodies are seen, recorded, photographed, or exhibited. They can decide if and to 
what extent their intimate information will be revealed, published, or disclosed. 
They can choose to tell another person about their sexual orientation, gender, or 
sexual history. 
Consent facilitated by sexual privacy is contextual and nuanced—it does not 
operate like an on-off switch.
48
 If a person rents an apartment, sexual privacy 
 
44. McClain, supra note 7, at 196. 
45. BRIDGES, supra note 27, at 121, 149. 
46. Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 350-54; Mary Anne Franks, Democratic Surveillance, 30 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 425, 464-73 (2017) [hereinafter Franks, Democratic Surveillance]; Mary Anne 
Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform: A View from the Front Lines, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1251, 1261-70 
(2017) [hereinafter Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform]; Mary Anne Franks, The Need for Sexual 
Privacy Laws, BROOKINGS (Sept. 8, 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2014
/09/08/the-need-for-sexual-privacy-laws [https://perma.cc/RV75-PAGW] (focusing on 
nonconsensual pornography). 
47. McClain, supra note 7, at 241 (“The goal of restricting access is also about power, the power to 
control one’s body . . . .”). 
48. Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 348, 354-56. Consent is a deeply contested issue, especially 
in the context of sexual assault. See Taylor Carroll, Defining Consent, AM. L. INST. ADVISER 
(Dec. 18, 2017), http://www.thealiadviser.org/sexual-assault/defining-consent [https://
perma.cc/CG7B-T9MK]. The American Law Institute is working on a model definition of 
consent for sexual assault cases. Jennifer Morinigo, Updated “Consent” Definition, AM. L. INST. 
ADVISER (Dec. 19, 2016), http://www.thealiadviser.org/sexual-assault/updated-consent 
-definition [https://perma.cc/WBS9-KGNS]. Among the contested issues are the ability to 
withdraw consent and consent by trickery. Thanks to Clare Huntington, Cynthia Godsoe, and 
Leigh Goodmark for discussing the issue with me. I leave detailed discussion of the complex-
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means that she can let a handyman into her apartment to fix a leak without giv-
ing the handyman permission to hide a tiny camera in her bathroom. If a person 
shares her childhood sexual assault with an intimate partner, sexual privacy al-
lows that person to ask the partner to keep that information confidential. If a 
person shares a nude photograph with an intimate partner, sexual privacy per-
mits that person to insist on confidentiality and to expect that no one else will 
access the image. After a hacker stole her intimate photos from her iCloud ac-
count and posted them online, actress Gabrielle Union remarked that sharing 




Sexual privacy secures the autonomy that is essential to self-development.
50
 
The human body serves as a “basic reference” for identity formation.
51
 It influ-
ences how individuals understand, develop, and construct their gender identity 
or sexuality.
52
 People develop a sense of individuality through their management 
 
ities of consent in the context of sexual-privacy invasions for my book project on sexual pri-
vacy. The key for this Article is that the context, settings, and expectations help us sort out 
whether a person’s consent is narrow or broad. For instance, just because someone takes off 
her clothes in an intimate partner’s bedroom does not mean that person has consented to the 
videotaping of what goes on in the bedroom unless the intimate partner has told her and asked 
her permission. Indeed, the reasonable expectation is that there is no video camera in the bed-
room. 
49. Abigail Pesta, Gabrielle Union: “My Nude Photos Were Stolen, and I’m Fighting Back,” COSMO-
POLITAN (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.cosmopolitan.com/entertainment/celebs/news/a32589
/gabrielle-union-my-nude-photos-were-stolen [https://perma.cc/B9LC-8UK8]. 
50. Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26, 40 (1976) (argu-
ing that the privacy accorded to intimate affairs conveys to individuals that their lives are their 
own). 
51. MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION 67-74 (2013); Tom Gerety, 
Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 266 (1977). The body can be a source of 
empowerment, but it also can be a source of deep anxiety when it does not match one’s expe-
rience of gender. Janet Mock writes movingly about how her genitals taunted her—she felt 
like a girl from a tender age and her genitals served as a rebuke to that feeling. MOCK, supra 
note 7, at 21-23, 188. 
52. We perform and construct gender identity; it is not fixed or static. See Paulan Korenhof & 
Bert-Jaap Koops, Gender Identity and Privacy: Could a Right to Be Forgotten Help Andrew Agnes 
Online? (Tilburg Inst. for Law, Tech., & Soc’y, Working Paper No. 3, 2013), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2304190. Our gender identity may not match how culture per-
ceives our bodies. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE 7 (1990) (explaining that culture 
and norms link some parts of our bodies—genitalia, female breasts, and buttocks—and not 
others to our person); see also Amy Kapczynski, Same-Sex Privacy and the Limits of Antidiscrim-
ination Law, 112 YALE L.J. 1257, 1274-77 (2003) (exploring the treatment of genitalia and “states 
of undress” as matters of culture, threat, and risk). 
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of the boundaries around their bodies.
53
 As Julie Cohen has written, one’s sense 
of self is bound up in “performance and performativity.”
54
 Free from public in-
spection, individuals can experiment with their intimate identities
55
 before re-
vealing them to others.
56
 
Being able to reveal one’s naked body, gender identity, or sexual orientation 
at the pace and in the way of one’s choosing is crucial to identity formation.
57
 
When the revelation of people’s sexuality or gender is out of their hands at piv-
otal moments, it can shatter their sense of self.
58
 For transgender people, being 
forced to reveal their former name (and wrong gender) can “trigger feelings of 
dysphoria and humiliation.”
59
 The psychic trauma produced by the unwanted 
exposure of one’s gender or sexual orientation can alter a person’s life plans.
60
 
Sexual privacy therefore creates a space for individuals to figure out their fu-
ture selves.
61
 It secures the ability to make life-defining decisions,
62
 giving indi-
viduals the necessary “breathing space away from familial or societal censure” to 
 
53. Irwin Altman explains that “[w]hen the permeability of these boundaries [to the self] is under 
the control of a person, a sense of individuality develops.” ALTMAN, supra note 28, at 50. 
54. COHEN, supra note 37, at 129. 
55. BRIDGES, supra note 27, at 197. 
56. ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY (1963). 
57. McClain, supra note 17, at 772. 
58. Talia Mae Bettcher, Evil Deceivers and Make-Believers: On Transphobic Violence and the Politics 
of Illusion, 22 HYPATIA 43, 50 (2007). 
59. Anna Lauren Hoffmann, Data, Technology, and Gender: Thinking About (and from) Trans Lives, 
in SPACES FOR THE FUTURE: A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY 3, 9 (Joseph C. 
Pitt & Ashley Shew eds., 2018). 
60. See id. 
61. Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“The State cannot demean [petitioners’] ex-
istence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.” (emphasis 
added)). 
62. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 
153 (1973). A robust literature challenges the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade to base the right 
to make important intimate decisions on privacy. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying 
Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 930 (1973); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex 
and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1020 (1984). Important scholarship has criticized 
Roe for failing to secure the right to privacy for the poor. See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Taking Lib-
erties: Privacy, Private Choice, and Social Contract Theory, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 461 (1987); Linda 
C. McClain, The Poverty of Privacy?, 3 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 119, 123-24 (1992); Dorothy E. 
Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of 
Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1424 (1991). I leave these concerns and the relationship be-
tween decisional privacy and informational privacy for my book project on sexual privacy. 
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make decisions about their intimate lives.
63
 As the Court underscored in Law-
rence v. Texas, personal decisions related to sexual intimacy permit individuals to 
define their “concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mys-
tery of human life.”
64
 
Sexual privacy’s importance to autonomy and self-development is at the 
heart of Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s landmark article The Right to Pri-
vacy. Although Warren and Brandeis addressed a rarified problem—press cover-
age of upper-crust dinner parties
65
—their project had broad implications for sex-
ual privacy.
66
 They were concerned about “daily papers” broadcasting the 
“details of sexual relations,”
67
 and they warned about “sordid spying” into the 
family home.
68
 Both individuals and society suffer, Warren and Brandeis argued, 
when intimacies “whispered in the closet” are “proclaimed from the house-
tops.”
69
 Exposing the “fact” of a “domestic occurrence” without consent risked 




Warren and Brandeis called for tort law to recognize a “right ‘to be let alone’” 
in the “sacred precincts of private and domestic life.”
71
 Individuals needed to 
control how much others knew about “the domestic circle.”
72
 The power to de-
termine the extent to which one’s “thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be 
communicated to others” was crucial.
73
 As Warren and Brandeis argued, a right 
 
63. Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1203-04 
(1998). Privacy in reproductive decisions protects an individual from having to tell the state 
about her reasons for exercising the choice to terminate a pregnancy. Id. 
64. 539 U.S. at 574 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851). 
65. See MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 97-98 (2012) (explaining how prominent 
Bostonian Samuel Warren convinced his law-school classmate and law-firm partner Louis 
Brandeis to coauthor The Right to Privacy because he was displeased with the attention that 
the press paid to his social life, in particular the dinner parties hosted by his wife Mabel, the 
daughter of a U.S. Senator). 
66. A little-known reason behind Samuel Warren’s interest in a right to privacy was his younger 
brother Ned’s homosexuality. As Charles Colman argues, Warren might have viewed the ar-
ticle as a way to protect his family from public scrutiny of his brother’s sexuality. Charles E. 
Colman, About Ned, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 128, 135 (2016). 
67. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196 (1890). 
68. Id. at 202 n.1. 
69. Id. at 195. 
70. Id. at 197, 201. 
71. Id. at 193-96. 
72. Id. at 196. 
73. Id. at 198. 
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One aspect of the “inviolate personality” is human dignity—the recognition 
that individuals should determine the arc of their intimate lives.
75
 Sexual privacy 
facilitates self-respect by affirming individual agency over one’s intimate life. To 
see themselves as the authors of their intimate lives, people need the ability to 
manage the boundaries around physical spaces like the home.
76
 
The ability to manage access to one’s naked body and intimate information 
enables people to present themselves as dignified and whole.
77
 It is integral to 
what Leslie Henry calls “personal integrity”—having the social bases of self-re-
spect.
78
 When intimate information is “removed from its original context and 
revealed to strangers, we are vulnerable” to being defined by that information.
79
 
For instance, when individuals’ intimate habits are publicly exposed, they may 
be “reduced” to nothing more than those habits, their genitals, or a sexual act.
80
 
Janet Mock explained her reluctance to tell colleagues about her trans woman-
hood in this way: “I . . . felt that if I told people I was trans . . . [b]eing trans 
would become the focus of my existence, and I would be forced to fight the im-
ages catalogued in people’s minds about trans people.”
81
 
In particular, the unwanted exposure of people’s nude bodies can give them 
a “diminished status,” which is often internalized “as a lack of full self-esteem.”
82
 
As Martha Nussbaum explains, “sexuality is an area of life in which disgust often 
 
74. Id. at 205. 
75. As Leslie Henry has explored in her important scholarship, dignity encompasses pluralistic 
values in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. See Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence 
of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169 (2011). The Court has used the term dignity in five distinct 
yet complementary ways: “institutional status as dignity, equality as dignity, liberty as dignity, 
personal integrity as dignity, and collective virtue as dignity.” Id. at 177 (emphasis omitted). 
Relying on the Court’s opinions, Henry shows that “each conception of dignity has a partic-
ular judicial function oriented toward safeguarding substantive interests against dignitary 
harm.” Id. I rely on Henry’s insights to underscore dignitary harms that accompany sexual-
privacy invasions. 
76. JULIE C. INNES, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 109 (1992). 
77. See id. 
78. Henry, supra note 75, at 215. 
79. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 9 (2000). 
80. See id. 
81. MOCK, supra note 7, at 248. 
82. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POLITICAL EMOTIONS: WHY LOVE MATTERS FOR JUSTICE 363 
(2013); see also Martha C. Nussbaum, Objectification and Internet Misogyny, in THE OFFENSIVE 
INTERNET 68, 73-74 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2010) (discussing online 





 Sex signifies our animal nature because it “involves the exchange 
of bodily fluids.”
84
 In nearly all societies, “people identify a group of sexual actors 
as disgusting or pathological, contrasting them with ‘normal’ or ‘pure’ sexual 
actors (prominently including the people themselves and their own group).”
85
 
That identified group often includes those who do not fall in line with hetero-
normativity—women who have had more than one sexual partner, LGBTQ in-
dividuals, and individuals in multiple sexual relationships.
86
 
None of this is to suggest that sex, gender, and sexuality are the essence of 
individuals’ identities.
87
 Other aspects of people’s lives are profoundly important 
to identity formation. As Neil Richards argues, being able to manage boundaries 
around one’s intellectual activities like reading, writing, and speaking is crucial 
to self-development.
88
 Without intellectual privacy, individuals might feel pres-
sured to conform to the uncontroversial.
89
 Just as the recognition of intellectual 
 
83. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 17 (2010). 
84. Id. 
85. Id. There is a similar dynamic at work when the state interrogates poor black mothers about 
their intimate lives when they apply for Medicaid. See BRIDGES, supra note 27. As Bridges doc-
uments in her scholarship, the state demands to know about poor mothers’ intimate activities, 
which have no bearing on their physical health or the well-being of their fetuses. They are 
asked whether their pregnancies were planned, how many sexual partners they have had, 
whether they are sexually adventurous, whether they have experienced sexual assault, and if 
they have ever exchanged sex for money or gifts. Id. at 111. By forcing poor mothers to reveal 
their histories with abortion, sexual assault, and prostitution, the State reduces them to those 
experiences. Poor mothers cannot present authentic identities—they are sexual assault vic-
tims, prostitutes, or sexual deviants. The state’s interrogations violate human dignity by say-
ing that poor mothers are the type of people who are unworthy of privacy. See Danielle Keats 
Citron, A Poor Mother’s Right to Privacy: A Review, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1139 (2018) (book review) 
(comparing Bridges’s book to the work of Charles Reich in providing a theory of privacy for 
the marginalized). 
86. NUSSBAUM, supra note 83, at 17-20 (explaining that the sexuality of women and LGBTQ in-
dividuals is often depicted as shameful and disgusting); see also Jimmie Manning & Danielle 
M. Stern, Heteronormative Bodies, Queer Futures: Toward a Theory of Interpersonal Panopticism, 
21 INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 208, 219 (2018) (arguing that sexuality is often used to shame indi-
viduals if it does not fall in line with heteronormativity, including punishing women for hav-
ing more than one sex partner while men are not). 
87. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 755 (1989) (contending that 
linking conceptions of privacy to self-definition risks essentialized identities—women as 
mothers—and offering an alternative view of privacy based on the prevention of totalitarian 
state control over citizens). 
88. RICHARDS, supra note 37, at 186. 
89. Id. at 101; see Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934 (2013); 
Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387 (2008); see also Julie E. Cohen, Ex-
amined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1428 (2000) 
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privacy does not mean that reading, writing, and speaking determine individu-
als’ personhood, the recognition of sexual privacy does not mean that sex, gen-
der, and sexuality exclusively define who individuals are. Rather, sexual privacy 
secures a source of autonomy that enables people to determine the shape of their 
identities. 
2. Sexual Privacy as Enabling Intimacy 
Another crucial aspect of sexual privacy is its role in fostering intimacy.
90
 
Sexual privacy lets people “giv[e] . . . themselves over” to each other physically 
and “be what they truly are—at least as bodies—intensely and together.”
91
 When 




Sexual privacy also provides an essential condition for the formation of inti-
mate relationships. Charles Fried contends that 
[t]o respect, love, trust, or feel affection for others and to regard our-
selves as the objects of love, trust, and affection is at the heart of our no-
tion of ourselves as persons among persons, and privacy is the necessary 




Said another way, love has difficulty developing without sexual privacy. 
As social-psychological research shows, sexual privacy enables the growth of 
intimate relationships, which develop through a process of reciprocal self-dis-
closure.
94
 Intimate partners reveal “vulnerable, socially undesirable facets of the 
 
(arguing that without privacy for intellectual activities, people shy away from unpopular ideas 
and embrace the bland and mainstream); Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and 
Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 181 (2008) (examining “the relationship between privacy and 
visibility in the networked information age”). 
90. See Robert S. Gerstein, Intimacy and Privacy, 89 ETHICS 76 (1978) (arguing that intimacy and 
intimate relationships could not exist without privacy); James Rachels, Why Privacy Is Im-
portant, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 323, 326 (1975) (same); Reiman, supra note 50, at 39 (same). 
91. Reiman, supra note 50, at 34-35. Of course, mutual revelation of our bodies is not always egal-
itarian. Unwanted pressure to reveal one’s body to an intimate partner can undermine mean-
ingful identity development and intimacy. See Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 351 (discussing 
how domestic abusers pressure partners to reveal intimate images). 
92. Reiman, supra note 50, at 35. 
93. FRIED, supra note 6, 138, 140. 
94. See ALTMAN & TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 52-55. In The Art of Loving, Erich Fromm explains that 





 They grow to trust one other with their innermost thoughts, feelings, 
and experiences because they believe that the other person will treat their infor-
mation as they hope rather than as they fear.
96
 Intimate relationships deepen as 
couples continue this process of mutual sharing.
97
 
Falling in love depends upon partners treating one another’s personal infor-
mation with care.
98
 Lovers “lay bare their innermost feelings to each other, they 
are lewd and foolish with each other, they stand naked before each other” on the 
premise that “what is shared so intimately will not be broadcast to the world at 
large.”
99
 People share their innermost thoughts, feelings, and beliefs when they 
believe intimate partners will not treat them as “inconsequential.”
100
 They will 
not hide or self-censor unappealing personal facts if they think their partners 
will be discreet with that information.
101
 Privacy is thus an important condition 
for achieving intimacy.
102
 Indeed, some scholars have argued that “relationships 




FROMM, THE ART OF LOVING 47 (1956). When people share innermost thoughts, values, and 
attitudes—what Fromm calls the core—they perceive their “identity, the fact of [their] broth-
erhood.” Id. 
95. ALTMAN & TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 169-72. 
96. Id. at 54-58, 77; John G. Holmes & John K. Rempel, Trust in Close Relationships, in CLOSE 
RELATIONSHIPS 187, 190 (Clyde Hendrick ed., 1989). 
97. See WALDMAN, supra note 37, at 67. 
98. BLOUSTEIN, supra note 9, at 125-26. 
99. Id. at 125. 
100. Ferdinand Schoeman, Privacy and Intimate Information, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF 
PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 403, 406 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984). 
101. Neil M. Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. 
L. REV. 431, 453 (2016). 
102. Id. at 453, 456. 
103. See, e.g., INNES, supra note 76, at 78 (contending that privacy only warrants protection if it 
involves decisions about and access to information about acts or matters that “draw[] their 
value and meaning from an agent’s love, care, or liking”); Gerety, supra note 51, at 236, 263 
(arguing that “intimacy” and the “intimacies of personal identity” are the “chief restricting 
concept in the definition of privacy”). Although I disagree with the premise that sexual privacy 
is the only privacy interest worth protecting, I have drawn considerable inspiration from the 
insights of scholars who underscore the importance of intimate privacy. It is also worth noting 
that seemingly innocuous information can reveal much about our intimate lives in our big-
data age. As the Supreme Court has underscored in recent Fourth Amendment decisions, 
knowing where someone has traveled over the course of a week can reveal information about 
her intimate life, including who she loves and whether she visited a family-planning clinic. 
See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217-18 (2018); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 
400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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The Supreme Court has recognized the relationship between privacy and in-
timacy. In Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, the Court acknowledged that people in highly 
personal relationships share a “special community of thoughts, experiences, and 
beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one’s life.”
104
 It attributed the 
constitutional shelter afforded highly personal relationships to the “realization 
that individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties with 
others.”
105
 “Protecting these relationships from unwarranted state interference 
therefore safeguards the ability independently to define one’s identity that is cen-
tral to any concept of liberty.”
106
 
Although sexual privacy is essential for intimacy, it is important even when 
intimate relationships are not involved. We need privacy when we try on cloth-
ing in a store, take a shower at the gym, or visit a public restroom. We need to 
be able to decide who knows about our gender identity or sexual preferences, 
even if such sharing has nothing to do with intimate relationships. We need sex-
ual privacy in our nude photos regardless of whether we created them in the 
context of an intimate relationship. Sexual privacy is indispensable to intimate 
relationships, but it deserves protection for other reasons as well. 
3. Sexual Privacy as Protecting Equality 
Sexual privacy’s recognition would also draw attention to—and account 
for—its significance in combating subordination. This Section explains how sex-
ual-privacy invasions often harm women and marginalized people more signifi-
cantly than other groups. It argues that a prior era’s invocation of privacy to jus-
tify subordination does not undermine sexual privacy’s importance for equal 
opportunity today. Even if the forces of discrimination recede, sexual privacy still 
deserves protection. 
a. Expressive Power 
The relationship between sexual privacy and gender, racial, sexual, and eco-
nomic equality is undeniable.
107
 Protecting sexual privacy involves a recognition 
 
104. 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984). 
105. Id. at 619. 
106. Id. (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); and 
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)). 
107. See, e.g., DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE 
MEANING OF LIBERTY 316 (1997) (“Governmental policies that perpetuate . . . subordination 
through the denial of procreative rights, which threaten both racial equality and privacy at 
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of the disproportionate impact that sexual-privacy invasions have on women, 
sexual minorities, and nonwhites, and on the lived experiences and suffering of 
these marginalized communities.
108
 Adopting measures to protect sexual privacy 
would say that these invasions constitute unacceptable forms of subordination
109
 
and discrimination—conceptualized by Deborah Hellman as actions that de-
grade individuals and deprive them of material opportunities.
110
 
Victims of sexual-privacy invasions lose their jobs.
111
 They have difficulty 
finding work when their nude photos appear in searches of their names.
112
 They 
feel humiliated and demeaned after cameras secretly videotape them in bed-
rooms, bathrooms, or showers, and the footage is posted online without author-
ization. Sexual-privacy invasions deprive individuals of their sense of belonging 
and the recognition of their equal citizenship.
113
 
Sexual-privacy invasions impact women and individuals from marginalized 
communities in distinctly damaging ways. Consider the attacks on black actress 
Leslie Jones after the release of the movie Ghostbusters, in which Jones had a star-
ring role. She reported that she received doctored photos depicting her with se-
 
once, should be subject to the most intense scrutiny.”); see also JUDITH WAGNER DECEW, IN 
PURSUIT OF PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS, AND THE RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 74 (1997) (“Protection of 
privacy enhances and ensures the freedom from such scrutiny, pressure to conform, and ex-
ploitation . . . .”). 
108. See infra Part II. 
109. CITRON, supra note 12, at 27, 197. 
110. Discrimination is a contested term with various meanings. I borrow from Deborah Hellman’s 
account of discrimination unless otherwise noted in this piece. Hellman explains that discrim-
ination is wrongful if it is demeaning, which has two criteria: (1) the conduct shows disrespect 
for another by debasing or degrading the person, and (2) the conduct might be a material 
put-down, an exercise of power over the person. DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINA-
TION WRONG? 7-8 (2011). 
111. CITRON, supra note 12, at 7; Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 352. 
112. CITRON, supra note 12, at 8; Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 352; Ari Ezra Waldman, A Breach 
of Trust: Fighting Nonconsensual Pornography, 102 IOWA L. REV. 709, 710 (2017); see also Mad-
sen v. Erwin, 481 N.E.2d 1160 (Mass. 1985) (finding no privacy-tort and constitutional law 
violations where plaintiff’s employer Christian Science Monitor demanded to know her sexual 
orientation and then fired her after learning she was gay). Transgender people have faced 
violent attack and lost custody over their children after their gender identities were revealed. 
See Jennifer Finney Boylan, Opinion, Britain’s Appalling Transgender ‘Debate,’ N.Y. TIMES 
(May 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/09/opinion/britain-transgender-debate
-caitlyn-jenner.html [https://perma.cc/P3ZN-PP3F]. 
113. Robin Lenhardt’s powerful scholarship on belonging and inequality inform all aspects of my 
discussion of equality. See R.A. Lenhardt, Race, Dignity, and the Right to Marry, 84 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 53 (2015); R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Con-
text, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803 (2004). 
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men on her face and that harassers compared her to an ape, with menacing pho-
tos to match.
114
 Her website was hacked, and its contents were replaced by pho-
tographs of her license and passport, nude photographs, and a video tribute to a 
dead zoo gorilla.
115
 Jones eventually departed Twitter in response to the harass-
ment. 
Kimberlé Crenshaw’s “intersectionality” framework shows that the forces 
that marginalize individuals tend to operate on multiple levels.
116
 People experi-
ence subordination differently based on their intersecting identities.
117
 The “in-
tersection of racism and sexism factors into [women of color’s] lives in ways that 
cannot be captured wholly by looking at the race or gender dimensions of those 
experiences separately.”
118
 As Dorothy Roberts explains, poor women of color 





114. Leslie Jones (@Lesdogg), TWITTER (July 18, 2016, 12:45 PM), https://twitter.com/lesdoggg
/status/755126377691680768 [https://perma.cc/E6DV-3ZPT] (“Ok I have been called Apes, 
sent pics of their asses, even got a pic with semen on my face. I’m tryin to figure out what 
human means. I’m out.”). 
115. See Abby Ohlheiser, Leslie Jones Was the Victim of a Hack, Reportedly Exposing Private Documents 
and Nude Photos, WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the 
-intersect/wp/2016/08/24/leslie-joness-website-goes-offline-after-reportedly-being-hacked 
[https://perma.cc/2PWV-3Y86]; see also Abby Ohlheiser, The Leslie Jones Hack Used All the 
Scariest Tactics of Internet Warfare at Once, WASH. POST (Aug. 26, 2016), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2016/08/26/the-leslie-jones-hack-used-all 
-the-scariest-tactics-of-internet-warfare-at-once [https://perma.cc/BUC7-DYTK] (explain-
ing that women of color are subjected to racism and sexism online). 
116. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against 
Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1244 (1991) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Mapping the Mar-
gins]; see also Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, Close Encounters of Three Kinds: On Teaching Dominance 
Feminism and Intersectionality, 46 TULSA L. REV. 151 (2010) (exploring the relationship be-
tween dominance feminism and intersectionality). 
117. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, What About #UsToo?: The Invisibility of Race in the #MeToo Move-
ment, 128 YALE L.J.F. 105, 107-08 (2018). For an early discussion of the intersectional nature of 
workplace sexual harassment, see LIN FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN: THE SEXUAL HARASS-
MENT OF WOMEN ON THE JOB 96, 116-18 (1978). 
118. Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, supra note 116, at 1244. 
119. Roberts, supra note 62, at 1424. People with identities that meet at the intersection of privilege 
and disadvantage face unique forms of discrimination and subordination. Darren Lenard 
Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: “Intersectionality,” “Multidimensionality,” and the Development of an 
Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285, 312 (2001). Black maleness—in the 
context of racial profiling, police brutality, and employment—is not a privileged identity, even 
though being male is generally viewed as a privilege in our society. Athena D. Mutua, Multi-
dimensionality Is to Masculinities What Intersectionality Is to Feminism, 13 NEV. L.J. 341, 345-49 
(2013); see also Hutchinson, supra, at 312 (noting the “heterosexual stereotypes that inform the 
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Using this framework, Angela Onwuachi-Willig insightfully argues that 
Jones’s experience should be viewed through an intersectional, multidimen-
sional lens.
120
 The invasions of Jones’s sexual privacy were fraught with racism 
and misogyny.
121
 Images posted on her own website exposed her racial and sex-
ual identities in demeaning and humiliating ways. Doctored photographs re-
duced her to genitalia and breasts; she was depicted as less than human. 
Relatedly, Mary Anne Franks has deployed this framework to explore what 
she calls “intersectional surveillance.”
122
 “Attentiveness to race, class, and gen-
der,” she has said, “is vital to understanding the true scope of the surveillance 
threat. Marginalized populations, especially those who experience the intersec-
tion of multiple forms of subordination, also often find themselves at the inter-




Intersectional surveillance, in the way that Franks has conceptualized it, was 
evident when a novelist was secretly taped by her boyfriend in his bedroom. The 
novelist discovered videos of their sexual encounters on her boyfriend’s com-
puter in a folder labeled “Indian Research.” As the novelist explained to me, she 
felt doubly shamed: as a woman and as an Indian-American.
124
 She was nothing 
more than her naked body and her brown skin. She felt humiliated by her treat-




Recognizing the novelist’s experience as a sexual-privacy invasion would at-
test to the intersectional injury that she suffered. It would say that when some-
one’s intersecting, marginalized identities are surveilled or exposed, the damage 
is multidimensional. It would make clear that sexual-privacy invasions suffused 
with gendered racism as in the novelist’s case produce double the shame and 
double the subordination. 
 
‘sexualized racism’ endured by all people of color”); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out yet Un-
seen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory and Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REV. 
561, 641 (1997) (using “multidimensionality” to reflect “the inherent complexity and irrevers-
ibly multilayered nature of everyone’s identities and of oppression”). 
120. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 117, at 114. 
121. Id. 
122. Franks, Democratic Surveillance, supra note 46, at 464-73. 
123. Id. at 464. 
124. Interview with Jane Doe (Aug. 27, 2016). The man faced charges under a state video-voyeur-
ism law for invading the privacy of several women. He eventually pleaded guilty. 
125. The woman spoke to me in connection with my book Hate Crimes in Cyberspace with an un-
derstanding that I would keep her name confidential. I am honoring that promise here. 
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b. Concealment 
Law and society have coerced “privacy” by forcing people to conceal their 
sexual orientation, gender, or bodies. This denies them the ability to manage the 
boundaries around their intimate lives, thus violating their sexual privacy and 
entrenching a sense of subordination.
126
 
Consider the pressure to hide one’s sexuality or gender identity in order to 
conform to a hegemonic heterosexual society.
127
 As Kenji Yoshino has written, 
sexual minorities have felt compelled to “cover”—men felt pressure to perform 
stereotypical heterosexual male attributes, such as aggressiveness, while women 
felt “pressure to mute attributes stereotypically associated with women, such as 
compassion.”
128
 Even today, LGBTQ individuals hide their sexuality or gender 
identity to prevent bigoted abuse.
129
 Writer Jennifer Boylan kept her female 




Law has undermined the sexual privacy of LGBTQ individuals. Military re-
cruits must conceal their gender identities as a condition of service.
131
 The De-
partment of Health and Human Services plans to define sex as “immutable bio-
logical traits identifiable by or before birth” for the purposes of federal civil rights 
law.
132
 This would eliminate the legal protections currently afforded transgender 
 
126. Thanks to Katharine Silbaugh for urging me to make this point explicit. 
127. See EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET (2008); Adrienne Rich, Com-
pulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, 5 SIGNS 631 (1980). 
128. KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 22, 143 (2006). 
129. See Sejal Singh & Laura E. Durso, Widespread Discrimination Continues to Shape LGBT People’s 




130. Jennifer Finney Boylan, Opinion, How a Sliver of Glass Changed My Life, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/04/opinion/transgender-coming-out.html 
[https://perma.cc/FG4K-D6XD]. 
131. Report and Recommendations on Service of Transgender Persons in the Military, U.S. DEP’T DEF. 4 
(Feb. 2018), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4420622/226-3.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3PQ8-LTZP] (“Transgender persons who have not transitioned to another gender 
and do not have a history or current diagnosis of gender dysphoria—i.e., they identify as a 
gender other than their biological sex but do not currently experience distress or impairment 
of functioning in meeting the standards associated with their biological sex—are qualified for 
service . . . .”). 
132. See Erica L. Green et al., ‘Transgender’ Could Be Defined Out of Existence Under Trump Admin-




people, forcing them to hide their identities to prevent discrimination. The now-
terminated “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy required gay military members to hide 
their sexuality from colleagues and superiors. 
Being forced to hide one’s sexual orientation or gender identity denies 
LGBTQ individuals sexual privacy. It takes away their freedom to decide how 
much of their intimate lives to reveal to others. It relegates them to the status of 
“others” who should be ashamed about their sexual orientation or gender iden-
tity. 
Along similar lines, nineteenth-century law forced some women to conceal 
their bodies “at a high cost to sexual choice and self-expression.”
133
 As I. Bennett 
Capers explains: 
Between 1850 and 1870, just as the abolitionist movement, then the Civil 
War, and then Reconstruction were disrupting the subordinate/superor-
dinate balance between blacks and whites, just as middle class white 
women were demanding social and economic equality, agitating for the 
right to vote, and quite literally asserting their right to wear pants, and 
just as lesbian and gay subcultures were emerging in large cities, juris-
dictions began passing sumptuary legislation which had the effect of re-
ifying sex and gender distinctions.
134
 
Many sumptuary laws explicitly banned cross-dressing,
135
 and women were 
the target of most enforcement actions.
136
 Courts relied on notions of modesty 
to deny these women sexual autonomy.
137
 Sumptuary laws violated sexual pri-
vacy by denying women the choice of how much of their bodies to reveal to the 
public. 
Society’s treatment of the home as a secluded domain where men could 
abuse their wives without state intervention should be viewed as part of this 
phenomenon of coerced concealment. Late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-
century courts invoked the concept of the private sphere to justify shielding 
spousal abusers from accountability.
138
 Until the mid-to-late twentieth century, 
 
133. Allen, supra note 62, at 471. 
134. I. Bennett Capers, Cross Dressing and the Criminal, 20 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 8 (2008) (foot-
notes omitted). 
135. Id. at 10. 
136. Kapczynski, supra note 52, at 1285. 
137. Id. at 1284. 
138. See Siegel, supra note 16, at 2165-67. In the late twentieth century, battered women’s advocates 
got the attention of lawmakers, courts, and law enforcement, discrediting the reasons behind 
society’s protection of domestic violence. See Citron, supra note 14, at 394. Law and norms 
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law recognized the privacy interests of male batterers while ignoring the privacy 
interests of battered women.
139
 In the home, battered women rarely enjoyed op-
portunities for sexual privacy.
140
 They had few moments of solitude and almost 
no sexual autonomy—their husbands often monitored and exerted control over 
their activities.
141
 Behind this legal position was the view that women were 
properly subject to spousal discipline.
142
 Domestic violence remained a private 




Some feminist scholars have viewed the invocation of “privacy” in the service 
of subordination as warranting its end. Catharine MacKinnon, for example, has 
claimed that privacy is inevitably a one-way ratchet to inequality.
144
 However, 
other feminist scholars have argued that privacy’s historical description does not 
dictate its normativity.
145
 Anita Allen has written that while “[w]omen have had 
too much of the wrong kinds of privacy,”
146
 subordinated individuals deserve 
“opportunities for privacy and the exercise of liberties that promote privacy.”
147
 
Just as the harm that results from some exercises of liberty does not lead to the 
rejection of liberty, the harm that results from some ostensible protections of 




have shifted, though not as completely as it was hoped. CITRON, supra note 12, at 98-99. Al-
though domestic violence remains a serious problem, the notion of “family privacy” as a shield 
to immunize domestic abusers no longer has the persuasive power it once enjoyed. 
139. See ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 17, at 79-80. 
140. Id. 
141. Siegel, supra note 16, at 2154. 
142. LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY 
VIOLENCE 250-58 (1988); Siegel, supra note 16, at 2154. 
143. CITRON, supra note 12, at 98-99. Leigh Goodmark has explored the downside to this trend in 
her important work. See, e.g., LEIGH GOODMARK, DECRIMINALIZING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A 
BALANCED POLICY APPROACH TO INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE (2018). 
144. MACKINNON, supra note 16, at 93, 101-02. MacKinnon argued that privacy entrenched male 
hierarchy and power—privacy was a right “for men ‘to be let alone’ to oppress women one at 
a time.” Id. at 102. 
145. See, e.g., Judith Wagner DeCew, The Feminist Critique of Privacy: Past Arguments and New Social 
Understandings, in SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 85, 90 
(Beate Roessler & Dorota Mokrosinska eds., 2015). 
146. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 17, at 37. 
147. Id. at 36. 
148. Id. at 37. 
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c. Beyond Equality 
Would sexual privacy matter if bigoted attitudes and discrimination disap-
peared? What if the exposure of naked bodies was no longer viewed with shame 
and posting nude images did not damage people’s reputations and careers? 
Would we still need sexual privacy if information about people’s sexual orienta-
tion or transgender identity would not be held against them? In other words, as 
Scott Skinner-Thompson asks in Outing Privacy, does our interest in sexual pri-
vacy have a limited shelf life?
149
 
In a sex-positive, bigotry-free world (one can dream!), we would still need 
sexual privacy. Regardless of whether anyone judges us, we should be able to 
manage the boundaries of our intimate lives.
150
 Even if no one cares whether our 
nude photos are posted online or whether we are bisexual, lesbian, or trans, we 
need to retain the ability to manage how much of our intimate lives is shared 
with others. When social attitudes and law recognize the equal rights and dignity 
of LGBTQ individuals, sexual minorities should still be able to control the dis-
closure of information about their sexuality or gender.
151
 
Further, the ability to share our naked bodies as we wish will still matter for 
sexual autonomy.
152
 Crash Pad and other sites make pornography that celebrates 
lesbian, trans, and queer women.
153
 Breast cancer survivors post photographs of 
their naked bodies to educate the public about the disease.
154
 These activities 
matter for sexual expression and sexual autonomy. 
Finally, even if bigotry recedes, the privacy accorded intimate relationships 
will remain important as well.
155
 Hannah Arendt argued that love “is killed, or 
 
149. Skinner-Thompson, supra note 27, at 194-95. 
150. In forthcoming work, I explore sexual privacy’s role in fostering trust in intimate relation-
ships. See Danielle Keats Citron, Why Sexual Privacy Matters for Trust, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2019). 
151. Thanks to Bennett Capers and Joe Landau for helpful conversations about these issues. 
152. Waldman, supra note 112, at 714-16. 
153. Maya M, The 16 Best Porn Sites for Queer Women, DAILY DOT (Apr. 27, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://
www.dailydot.com/irl/best-lesbian-porn-sites [https://perma.cc/S3YV-EPW6]. An actress 
posted pictures of herself after her hysterectomy to raise awareness about ovarian fibroids and 
the challenges of reproductive health. Lena Dunham, In Her Own Words: Why Lena Dunham 
Chose to Have a Hysterectomy at 31, VOGUE (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.vogue.com/article
/lena-dunham-hysterectomy-vogue-march-2018-issue [https://perma.cc/P666-QGGZ]. 
Crucially, she chose to be seen in a hospital gown and to share the fact of her hysterectomy. 
154. See, e.g., Post Mastectomy Photo Gallery, FORCE, https://www.facingourrisk.org 
/understanding-brca-and-hboc/post-mastectomy-photo-gallery.php [https://perma.cc
/S6LY-2UTE]. 
155. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 51, 73 (1958). 
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rather extinguished, the moment it is displayed in public.”
156
 Human activities 
involving love, sex, and intimacy need protection from the public glare if they 
are to flourish.
157
 Without sexual privacy, we may be unable to forge relation-
ships of love and trust. 
The recognition that intimate activity and nudity can be viewed as discredit-
ing and shameful—and result in discrimination—is not to suggest that intimate 
behaviors and nudity are discrediting and shameful. Intimate activities and na-
ked bodies are not dirty. Because sexuality, gender, and the human body are cen-
tral to identity formation and intimacy, we need the freedom to manage their 
boundaries. 
Sexual privacy matters and will continue to matter even if hatred and subor-
dination recede. And for now, because sexual-privacy invasions can lead to mar-
ginalization and discrimination, we must recognize, understand, and address 
their relationship to equality. 
C. Identifying Sexual-Privacy Interests 
Sexual-privacy interests can be identified by examining their proximity to 
the values that sexual privacy protects. Sexual privacy is concerned with sexual 
autonomy, self-determination, and dignity secured when people can manage the 
boundaries around their bodies, intimate information, and intimate activities. 
Autonomy-denying activities—such as the nonconsensual recording of a cou-
ple’s sexual encounter—implicate sexual-privacy interests. Sexual privacy is also 
concerned with the intimacy and trust that develop when partners handle one 
another’s intimate information with discretion. Trust-betraying conduct—such 
as the broadcasting of an ex-intimate’s confidences about their transgender iden-
tity—involves sexual-privacy interests. Then too, sexual privacy is concerned 
with the subordinating impact on women and minorities that results from its 
denial. Shaming women and minorities for their nude bodies, sexuality, and 
gender—such as the posting of a deep-fake sex video depicting a woman being 
raped
158
—implicates sexual-privacy interests. 
Acts that undermine these concerns to a significant enough degree, depend-
ing upon the context, settings, and actors involved, constitute sexual-privacy in-
vasions. 
Consider these illustrations. First, during graduate school, a woman shared 
sexually explicit photographs and videos with a man with whom she was in a 
 
156. Id. at 51. 
157. BOLING, supra note 38, at 68. 
158. See infra Section II.B.5. 
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long-distance relationship. The man promised to keep the woman’s photos and 
videos to himself. After the relationship ended, however, the man posted the 




The man’s exposure of his ex-girlfriend’s naked body and his betrayal of her 
trust implicate sexual-privacy interests. The man hijacked the woman’s sexual 
autonomy, forcing her naked body and sexual expression onto a virtual stage 
before an audience of family members, peers, and strangers; he damaged her 
social identity because the photos appear in searches of her name.
160
 The man’s 
actions also affected the woman’s ability to trust future intimates. Mutual self-
disclosure is difficult after ex-partners weaponize intimate communications.
161
 
Finally, subordination may be unavoidable. The woman will surely confront the 
gendered stereotype that she is a careless slut who brought the problem on her-
self. She may have difficulty finding and keeping work, as is often the case when 
a woman’s nude photos appear in searches of her name. In sum, given their au-
tonomy-denying, identity-destroying, intimacy-interfering, and equality-jeop-
ardizing nature, the man’s actions constitute a sexual-privacy invasion. 
That said, even if the man was a casual hookup rather than an ex-intimate, 
his actions would still have invaded sexual-privacy interests. In that case, the 
woman’s sexually explicit photos and videos warrant sexual-privacy protection 
not for their direct connection to intimacy, but for their importance to sexual 
autonomy. Being able to reveal one’s naked body as one chooses is central to self-
development and personal integrity. That would be true even if the man posted 
texts from the woman describing her sexual fantasies rather than her photos and 
videos. The public revelation of a person’s sexual expression without consent 
interferes with that person’s autonomy and self-respect. 
Second, a hotel employee hid a video camera in a guest bathroom in order to 
tape people undressing and showering. He posted on a porn site a video of a 
female guest showering and included her name and address in the post. He then 
emailed the woman to say that unless she sent him nude photos, he would send 
 
159. I base this example on cases where revenge-porn victims have been represented by the Cyber 
Civil Rights Legal Project, a pro bono effort of K&L Gates. Those victims’ real names deserve 
protection to prevent further harm. See, e.g., Complaint, Doe v. Elam, No. CV 14-9788 (C.D. 
Cal. Dec. 22, 2014); Civil Lawsuit on Revenge Porn, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www 
.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/01/29/business/dealbook/document-civil-lawsuit-on 
-revenge-porn.html [https://perma.cc/YC6E-WJZQ]; Erica Fink, To Fight Revenge Porn, I 
Had to Copyright My Breasts, CNN (Apr. 27, 2015), https://money.cnn.com/2015/04/26 
/technology/copyright-boobs-revenge-porn/index.html [https://perma.cc/LWP4-VBDD]. 
160. Fink, supra note 159. 
161. Citron, supra note 150, at 3. 
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the video to her colleagues.
162
 The man followed through on his threat after the 
woman refused. The woman felt forced to show the video to her parents and 
employer—she did not want them to find out about it on their own.
163
 
The hotel employee’s actions constitute a profound sexual-privacy viola-
tion—first with the unauthorized taping of the woman’s naked body, then with 
the posting of the video and attempt to extort more nude photos, and finally 
with the sharing of the video with the woman’s colleagues. The hotel employee 
denied the woman agency over her body and sexual identity. The employee in-
vaded a space where she assumed she could undress without anyone watching 
her, let alone videotaping her, and she had no power over who saw her naked 
body. As soon as she refused the demand for nude photos, the video was sent to 
her colleagues. 
Every post and email violated the woman’s personal integrity. She feared col-
leagues would see her as a naked body, not a whole person.
164
 She worried the 
videos would affect her career, and she feared for her safety. That the woman 
never met the perpetrator (and thus no intimacy was invaded and no agreement 
of confidentiality was violated) does not remove this case from the heart of sex-
ual privacy. 
Third, a man secretly photographed a woman up her skirt while she was 
shopping at a store and posted the photo online. The woman never authorized 
the man to take the photo or to post it online. The man robbed the woman of 
her decision to cover her genitals from public exposure. He undermined her con-
trol over the extent to which her body parts were visible to the public. 
What if the man never posted the up-skirt photo online? The denial of the 
woman’s sexual autonomy and the attack on her personal integrity would re-
main. In taking the photo, the man denied the woman the ability to manage 
access to her body. Although there is nothing shameful about genitals, the fact 
that the man took the photo nonetheless instills a sense of embarrassment, 
shame, and fear. 
Now suppose someone invades a coworker’s privacy by publishing a letter 
he wrote to his intimate partner. For instance, suppose a man wrote a note to his 
husband, telling him that he had lunch with their son. He left the note on his 
desk at work. A colleague took a photo of the note and posted it on Facebook 
 
162. This example stems from a young woman’s experience. I am keeping her name and the spe-






without asking for permission. In The Right to Privacy, Warren and Brandeis im-
agined a similar scenario—the nonconsensual publication of a benign letter be-
tween father and son—to illustrate a violation of the “right to be let alone.”
165
 
For Warren and Brandeis, the “right to be let alone” meant that people had con-




Privacy is at issue because the man neither expected nor wanted his colleague 
to post the letter online. But the post does not invade sexual privacy. There has 
been no unauthorized disclosure of someone’s naked body, intimate activities, or 
a violation of trust between intimates. The letter peripherally relates to sexual 
privacy because it involves the written communications of a gay couple, but 
nothing suggests that the letter writer hid his homosexuality from colleagues. 
The post did not reveal private intimate information because their marriage is 
matter of public record. 
This scenario would implicate sexual-privacy interests if the letter included 
a description of the man’s sexual desires.
167
 Then, the photograph and post 
would undermine the man’s control over intimate information. It would reduce 
him to his sexual fantasies in the eyes of colleagues and friends. The colleague 
would have invaded sexual-privacy interests even though he had not betrayed an 
intimate’s trust or published a sexually explicit photograph.
168
 
The values that sexual privacy protects help supply criteria for policy makers, 
courts, and law enforcers interested in protecting sexual-privacy interests. Sex-
ual privacy involves sexual-autonomy-denying, intimacy-undermining, or 
equality-corroding privacy invasions concerning: 
 nude bodies or simulated nude bodies (or parts of the body associated 
with sex and gender like the anus, buttocks, and female breasts); 
 information about sex, sexual activity, sexual fantasies, sexual orienta-
tion, or gender; 
 
165. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 67, at 201. 
166. Id. 
167. The hack and leak of information posted to the website Ashley Madison—an online dating 
service for married people—comes to mind. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Maram Sala-
heldin, Opinion, Leave the Cheaters in Peace: If You Poke Around the Ashley Madison Data, You’re 
Aiding and Abetting the Hackers, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 24, 2015), https://www.nydailynews
.com/opinion/citron-salaheldin-leave-cheaters-peace-article-1.2333852 [https://perma.cc
/ZH8A-W9K6] (arguing that alleged adulterers deserve privacy). 
168. As Part III explores, existing law likely would not provide redress for this scenario, and current 
First Amendment doctrine may not permit its redress. 
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 sexual expression, including photos, videos, text, email, and other digi-
tal communications related to sex, sexuality, and gender; or 
 physical spaces where individuals typically undress or engage in physical 
intimacy, such as bedrooms, bathrooms, and dressing rooms. 
These criteria can help lawmakers, courts, and scholars identify sexual-pri-
vacy invasions worth protecting.
169
 That is not to say that law should address 
those interests in the same manner. Not at all. Instead, these criteria contribute 
to the descriptive project of identifying sexual-privacy interests essential for pol-
icy makers. A related issue, to which we now turn, concerns the question of pri-
vacy-privacy trade-offs. 
D. Privacy-Privacy Trade-offs 
Once a sexual-privacy interest has been identified, it may be necessary to 
wrestle with competing privacy interests. As David Pozen describes, protecting 
“privacy along a certain axis may entail compromising privacy along another 
axis.”
170
 This task can be thought of as a “privacy-privacy tradeoff.”
171
 
Weighing competing privacy interests requires thoughtful analysis. Policy 
makers and courts need “guidance on how to weigh—or, in cases of incommen-
surability, how to order—various privacy interests when hard choices must be 
made among them.”
172
 They must wrestle with competing privacy values in a 
careful and comprehensive way, lest decisions about those conflicts be left to 
whimsy. Developing an analytical framework for evaluating privacy-privacy 
trade-offs is an urgent task.
173
 
We have already seen law’s failure to recognize privacy-privacy trade-offs. 
Law once protected batterers’ interests in family privacy without considering 
battered wives’ sexual-privacy interests. The batterers’ privacy interest was 
weak, as it was founded on the now-rejected view that spousal battering was 
 
169. So long as doing so would comport with First Amendment commitments. I explore the First 
Amendment implications of legislative and common law efforts to address sexual-privacy in-
vasions in Part III. 
170. Pozen, supra note 5, at 222. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. at 243. 
173. Id. In his project, Pozen builds a framework for understanding privacy-privacy trade-offs. His 
insightful work focuses on government surveillance efforts. 
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There are many contemporary examples of sexual-privacy interests that 
should be prioritized over competing privacy interests.
175
 Let’s return to the man 
who posted his ex-girlfriend’s nude photos online and emailed them to her par-
ents and classmates. Suppose the man used a pseudonym in the emails and posts. 
The woman would need to establish the identity of the person responsible for 
the posts and emails in order to bring a lawsuit. Obtaining the IP address asso-
ciated with the post and the computer assigned to that address is essential to 
identifying the perpetrator. The man has a privacy interest at stake—the ability 
to speak online anonymously. Anonymity can constitute a weighty privacy value 
when the speaker is addressing political, religious, or cultural matters.
176
 But not 
here. Rather than expressing views about politics or art, the man betrayed an 
intimate’s trust and publicly disclosed her nude images. The woman’s sexual-




In The Unwanted Gaze, Jeffrey Rosen argues that employees have an interest 
in carving out private spaces at work where they can form friendships free from 
scrutiny.
178
 What if employee A shows employee B a nude image of employee C 
while sitting in the break room? During an intimate relationship, C shared the 
nude photo with A on the understanding that A would keep the photo confiden-
tial. C’s interest in sexual privacy should be prioritized over B’s interest in the 




174. See generally Siegel, supra note 16 (chronicling how the state historically sanctioned domestic 
violence, both formally and tacitly). 
175. Pozen, supra note 5, at 230 (discussing sexual privacy in the context of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell). 
176. CITRON, supra note 12, at 60-61. 
177. See Jon Penney & Danielle Keats Citron, When Law Frees Us to Speak, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2019) (exploring the silencing impact of online harassment and describing orig-
inal empirical research showing that the existence of cyberharassment laws encourages vic-
tims to stay online rather than retreat in silence). 
178. ROSEN, supra note 79, at 122-25. 
179. Leslie Henry and I discuss a similar example in our review of Daniel Solove’s book Under-
standing Privacy. Danielle Keats Citron & Leslie Meltzer Henry, Visionary Pragmatism and the 
Value of Privacy in the Twenty-First Century, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1107, 1122 (2010) (book review). 
We criticized Solove for failing to rank privacy interests and argued that policy makers need 
guidance when dealing with competing privacy claims. Id. at 1122-23. 
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Difficult issues will surely arise. There will be cases where sexual-privacy in-
terests clash with each other and with similarly significant privacy interests.
180
 
Suppose a man asks his intimate partner for permission to tape their sexual en-
counters. Watching the tapes, the man explains, will help alleviate his pornog-
raphy addiction. The man pledges to keep the tape to himself. Without permis-
sion, the man shows the sex tape to fellow participants in a group psychotherapy 
session. In disclosing the tape to others, the man invades his partner’s sexual 
privacy. At the same time, investigating the man’s actions would impinge upon 
another strong privacy interest—the confidentiality of therapy sessions. Where, 
as here, sexual privacy clashes with another important privacy interest, policy 
makers and courts should weigh the competing interests in a manner that min-




Some privacy scholars have declined to provide an ordering of privacy values. 
That task, however, is unavoidable. Daniel Solove argues that privacy encom-
passes related, overlapping dimensions whose value must be assessed from the 
ground up.
182
 But those ground-up assessments require normative inputs.
183
 
i i .  sexual-privacy invasions 
This Part discusses sexual-privacy invasions and the harm that results from 
them. It begins with brief historical background and then shifts its focus to con-
temporary sexual-privacy invasions. 
 
180. See ANITA L. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY: WHAT MUST WE HIDE? 173-94 (2011). Alice Ris-
trophe raised an interesting point to me: whether there is a clash of sexual-privacy interests 
when a sexual-privacy invader is imprisoned. To be sure, part of the carceral experience is an 
utter denial of privacy, including sexual privacy. For instance, prisoners have no privacy in 
bathrooms where they are forced to shower next to other inmates. Guards routinely search 
prisoners’ undergarments and anal cavities for weapons. This is true for anyone incarcerated, 
not just sexual-privacy invaders. Thus, when a sexual-privacy invader is incarcerated, the per-
son’s punishment includes a denial of sexual privacy. The victim’s sexual-privacy interest is 
better seen as incompatible, rather than as clashing, with a perpetrator’s sexual-privacy inter-
est (if sexual-privacy invasions warrant incarceration, which many should). Certainly, the 
perpetrator’s sexual-privacy interest is less compelling than the victim’s sexual-privacy inter-
est. 
181. See Pozen, supra note 5, at 243. 
182. SOLOVE, supra note 29, at 40. Solove has argued that because aggregations of innocuous data 
may allow inferences about sensitive matters, it is unhelpful to designate particular personal 
data as worthy of special protection. Id. at 68-70. As this Article argues, certain privacy inter-
ests, like sexual privacy, are more important than others. 
183. See Citron & Henry, supra note 179, at 1122-24. 
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A. Brief Historical Background 
In nineteenth-century America, enslaved individuals had no sexual pri-
vacy.
184
 White masters forced enslaved men and women to disrobe in order to 
inspect their bodies.
185
 Enslaved “black women were taken into the town square 
to be sold. They were paraded around naked, to be inspected and critiqued for 
future sale and sure abuse.”
186
 Their bodies were treated as “items of public (in-
deed pornographic) display.”
187
 White masters sexually assaulted enslaved 
women and forced them to bear their children.
188
 
The situation was hardly better for free black women. In the northern states, 
employment agencies pushed black women into prostitution.
189
 Gerda Lerner 
has noted that “the free availability [of black women] as sex objects to any white 
man was enshrined in tradition, upheld by the laws forbidding intermarriage, 
enforced by terror against black men and women[,] and . . . tolerated both in its 
clandestine and open manifestations.”
190
 
Black men and women, enslaved and free, were denied sexual privacy be-
cause they were deemed unworthy of it.
191
 Dorothy Roberts has explained that 
black women were “exiled from the norm of true womanhood.”
192
 Racist my-
thology labeled the black woman as a “licentious temptress” and degenerate.
193
 




In the postslavery era, black women in the segregated South remained “hy-
pervisible and on display.”
195
 According to Patricia Hill Collins, black women 
working as domestic laborers in white-controlled private homes were subject to 
 
184. Franks, Democratic Surveillance, supra note 46, at 441-42. 
185. See id. 
186. Pesta, supra note 49. 
187. McClain, supra note 17, at 770 (citing PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: 
KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 163-80 (1991)). 
188. ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE & CLASS 25-27 (1983). 
189. MARY M. BROWNLEE & W. ELLIOTT BROWNLEE, WOMEN IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 244 
(1976). 
190. GERDA LERNER, BLACK WOMEN IN WHITE AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 163-64 (1973). 
191. ROBERTS, supra note 107, at 23. 
192. Id. at 10. 
193. Id. at 11. 
194. Id. 
195. PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, FIGHTING WORDS: BLACK WOMEN AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 20 
(1998). 
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various techniques of surveillance, including close scrutiny, sexual harassment, 
assault, and violence.
196
 “[W]ithin these labor conditions of hypervisibility,” 
Simone Browne has observed, “black domestic workers needed to assume a cer-




The same conceptions of womanhood that led to the public exposure of black 
women’s bodies
198
 also led to the control of upper- and middle-class white 
women in the “family home,”
199
 where they enjoyed little or no sexual privacy. 
These women had few opportunities to enjoy solitude and repose in the home.
200
 
John Stuart Mill wrote that husbands colonized wives’ “sentiments” and bod-
ies.
201
 Wives were expected to bear children and care for their families, adhering 
to a “cult of domesticity.”
202
 The bourgeois ideal was the white woman working 
at home and the white man working in the community.
203
 The public/private 
 
196. Id. at 20-22. 
197. SIMONE BROWNE, DARK MATTERS: ON THE SURVEILLANCE OF BLACKNESS 57 (2015). Browne’s 
book is a tour de force on how contemporary surveillance technologies and practices are in-
formed by the methods of policing black life under slavery. 
198. See McClain, supra note 17, at 770; see also TONI MORRISON, RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDER-
ING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL 
REALITY (1992). 
199. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 17. 
200. Id. 
201. JOHN STUART MILL, The Subjection of Woman, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER WRITINGS 117, 132 
(Stefan Collini ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1869). 
202. Cf. CARL N. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION 
TO THE PRESENT 375 (1980). Working-class women did not fit this model of domesticity given 
their need to work. Nineteenth-century feminists held views about social purity that led to 
concerns about prostitution and the erosion of female virtue. See Kathy Peiss, “Charity Girls” 
and City Pleasures: Historical Notes on Working-Class Sexuality, 1880-1920, in POWERS OF DE-
SIRE: THE POLITICS OF SEXUALITY 74, 74-75 (Ann Snitow et al. eds., 1983). Thanks to Linda 
McClain who helpfully discussed this history of the “sex wars” with me. 
203. DEGLER, supra note 202, at 375. Sarah Josepha Hale, a journalist in the 1830s, described women 
as “God’s appointed agent of morality” with a responsibility to use their power within the 
family to refine men’s “human affections and elevate [their] moral feelings.” SARAH JOSEPHA 
HALE, WOMAN’S RECORD: OR, SKETCHES OF ALL DISTINGUISHED WOMEN, FROM “THE BEGIN-
NING” TILL A.D. 1850. ARRANGED IN FOUR ERAS. WITH SELECTIONS FROM FEMALE WRITERS OF 
EVERY AGE, at xxxv-xxxvii (N.Y.C., Harper & Bros. 1853). The “True Woman was domestic, 
docile, and reproductive. The good bourgeois wife was to limit her fertility, [and] symbolize 
her husband’s affluence.” CARROLL SMITH-ROSENBERG, DISORDERLY CONDUCT: VISIONS OF 
GENDER IN VICTORIAN AMERICA 225 (1985). 
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distinction reflected the differentiation of the male from the family, the family 
from the state and market, and the superior from the inferior.
204
 
Meanwhile, for much of the twentieth century, workplace sexual harassment 
was rampant. It was acceptable to gawk at, ogle, and touch women.
205
 Sexual 
harassment was viewed as a perk of men’s employment rather than as invidious 
discrimination.
206
 Law and social norms, however, began to shift in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, though change has been slow.
207
 In the wake of Anita 
Hill’s testimony at Justice Thomas’s confirmation hearings in 1991, African 




Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, sexual minorities could 
not draw boundaries around their intimate affairs. State sodomy laws effectively 
criminalized their intimate interactions.
209
 Until the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Lawrence v. Texas,
210
 the fear of state intrusion hung over intimate interactions 
of LGBTQ individuals. As Anita Allen explains, restroom stalls and bedrooms 
were “not reliably private for the LGBT community.”
211
 For instance, a gay man 
was arrested and charged with sodomy after someone spied on him in a store’s 
bathroom. A Georgia appeals court explained that the man had no right to pri-
vacy in the bathroom stall, even though he was simply going to the restroom, 
because the store had an interest in securing restrooms free of crime.
212
 Similarly, 
after a woman’s ex-husband secretly photographed her having sex with her fe-
male lover, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that the woman had no right 
 
204. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (“Man is, or should be, woman’s protector 
and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex 
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life . . . . The paramount destiny and 
mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother.”). American 
attitudes reflected Aristotle’s distinction in Politics between the polis, the political realm allo-
cated exclusively to men, and the oikos, the domestic realm inhabited by women. See 2 ARIS-
TOTLE, Politics, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1986, 1999-2000, 2027 (Jonathan 
Barnes ed., B. Jowett trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1984) (c. 350 B.C.E.). 
205. CITRON, supra note 12, at 22. 
206. Citron, supra note 14, at 394. 
207. CITRON, supra note 12, at 22-23. 
208. African American Women in Defense of Ourselves, in DOCUMENTING INTIMATE MATTERS: PRI-
MARY SOURCES FOR A HISTORY OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 200, 201 (Thomas A. Foster ed., 
2013). 
209. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 & 192 n.5 (1986); JOEY L. MOGUL ET AL., QUEER 
(IN)JUSTICE: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF LGBT PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 11-16 (2011). 
210. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
211. Allen, supra note 43, at 1721. 
212. Elmore v. Atl. Zayre, Inc., 341 S.E.2d 905, 906 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). 
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to be free from surveillance in her bedroom.
213
 According to the court, the man 
was justified in spying on his ex-wife and her lover because her lesbian affair was 
relevant to a child-custody battle.
214
 
These examples illustrate how sexual privacy was invaded and exploited in 
the past. The next Section focuses on contemporary sexual-privacy invasions 
and the injuries that they inflict. 
B. Sexual Privacy in the Digital Age 
Some sexual-privacy invasions from the past persist in the present.
215
 Cul-
tural attitudes about women and sexual minorities have not changed as quickly 
or as profoundly as one might have hoped.
216
 For white women, women of color, 
LBT women, and girls, sexual-privacy invasions persist in different forms.
217
 
Gay men, trans men, and boys continue to have their intimate activities and 
identities surveilled and exposed in unwanted ways.
218
 
This Section highlights contemporary sexual-privacy invasions, including: 
(1) digital voyeurism, (2) up-skirt photos, (3) sextortion, (4) nonconsensual 
pornography, and (5) deep-fake sex videos. Although heterosexual men also ex-
perience these sexual-privacy invasions, the brunt of the harm is suffered by 
women, marginalized communities, and minors. 
 
213. Plaxico v. Michael, 735 So. 2d 1036, 1040 (Miss. 1999). 
214. Id. 
215. See Franks, Democratic Surveillance, supra note 46, at 441 (explaining how privacy has been 
unequally distributed in society with the burden borne by traditionally subordinated groups); 
see also CITRON, supra note 12, at 13-17 (documenting particular targeting of women and mi-
norities and the misogynistic, homophobic, racist, and anti-Semitic nature of abuse); Danielle 
Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 67 (2009) (same); Citron, supra note 14, 
at 384-89 (same); Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 347 (same); Mary Anne Franks, Sexual 
Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. 655, 657-58 (2012) (same). 
216. Suffice it to say that the confirmation hearings of Judge Brett Kavanaugh to the Supreme 
Court demonstrated the way that sexual assault and gendered harms (including the shaming 
of women for alleged promiscuity) continue to be trivialized in public discourse. 
217. As Khiara Bridges’s scholarship has shown, poor mothers’ privacy is virtually nonexistent. See 
BRIDGES, supra note 27, at 1-2, 116. 
218. Kendra Albert explains that trans individuals may feel “pressed to perform gender in ultra-
feminine or ultra-masculine ways” to be considered feminine or masculine enough to obtain 
publicly funded hormone therapy or other government services. Albert, supra note 27, at 18. 
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1. Digital Voyeurism 
Observing, tracking, and recording bodies and intimate activities is not new. 
Individuals have long used technology to watch and record others in places and 
zones where being watched and recorded is neither welcome nor expected. But 
digital technologies have extended the voyeur’s reach by facilitating remote and 
ubiquitous surveillance. 
Video voyeurism violates people’s sexual privacy by denying their autonomy. 
It effectively takes dominion over their bodies, intimate activities, and sexual in-
teractions without permission. It hijacks their ability to decide who has access to 
their body, bedroom, or bathroom. It undermines people’s sense that they con-
trol their intimate lives. When voyeurs are former intimates, the secret spying 
and surveillance undermines people’s ability to develop in the future the trust 
necessary for relationships of love and caring. 
Consider the secret audio and video recording of people at home. A quick 
online search yields an array of inexpensive coat hooks, clock radios, and smoke 
detectors with hidden cameras.
219
 Perpetrators—often landlords, maintenance 





219. See, e.g., Todd Magel, Man’s Arrest Prompts Hidden Camera Concerns in Iowa, KCCI DES 
MOINES (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.kcci.com/article/mans-arrest-prompts-hidden-camera
-concerns-in-central-iowa/19706016 [https://perma.cc/46XT-VG4Z]. 
220. See Welsh v. Martinez, 114 A.3d 1231, 1234 (Conn. App. Ct. 2015) (upholding an invasion-of-
privacy claim against a man who gave the plaintiff gifts for her bedroom, including a clock 
radio, that contained hidden cameras). For news accounts, see Shelby Brown, What This 
Landlord Allegedly Did to Spy on Tenant Will Creep You Out, WTVR (Jan. 16, 2015, 11:10 AM), 
https://wtvr.com/2015/01/16/landlord-sued-over-spy-camera [https://perma.cc/4F7M 
-VPXB]; John Genovese, Maintenance Man Hid Camera, Spied on Residents at Apartment Com-
plex, Warren County Sheriff Says, WCPO CIN. (May 26, 2016), https://www.wcpo.com/news
/crime/maintenance-man-hid-camera-spied-on-residents-at-apartment-complex 
-warren-county-sheriff-says [https://perma.cc/QEG7-ZBDG]; Robert Hadley, Chicago Ten-
ant Accuses Landlord of Recording Intimate Moments via Hidden Camera, COOK COUNTY REC. 
(Dec. 7, 2015), https://cookcountyrecord.com/stories/510651393-chicago-tenant-accuses 
-landlord-of-recording-intimate-moments-via-hidden-camera [https://perma.cc/K7UR 
-LYVU] (reporting on a lawsuit filed by a tenant against a landlord for secretly installing a 
camera in the smoke detector above his bed); Michelle Pekarsky, Landlord Faces 42 Counts of 
Invasion of Privacy for Cameras Found in KC Woman’s Midtown Apartment, FOX4KC (Aug. 18, 
2015, 3:37 PM), https://fox4kc.com/2015/08/18/landlord-faces-42-counts-of-invasion-of 
-privacy-for-cameras-found-in-kc-womans-midtown-apartment [https://perma.cc/UUN8 
-9Z2P] (explaining that a landlord was accused of planting hidden video cameras in tenants’ 
bedrooms and bathrooms); and Erica Thompson, Former Montauk Resident Sentenced After 
Illegally Spying on Tenants, E. HAMPTON PRESS (Oct. 13, 2014, 8:20 AM), https://www.27east
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For instance, a college professor who welcomed LGBT teenagers to live in 
his house after the teens had been kicked out of their homes for “coming out” 
hid a video camera in the guest bathroom.
221
 Rutgers University student Dharun 
Ravi secretly filmed his roommate Tyler Clementi kissing a man and watched 
the live feed with six friends.
222
 Ravi received just a thirty-day sentence for in-




The home is not the voyeur’s only target. Secret recording devices are placed 
in locker rooms and even doctors’ examination rooms.
224
 A Maryland rabbi used 
a spy-camera clock radio to secretly videotape one hundred and fifty women 
while they undressed for the ritual bath known as the mikvah.
225
 The rabbi re-
ceived a jail sentence of seventy-eight months, even though prosecutors had re-
quested seventeen years.
226
 A Johns Hopkins gynecologist secretly photo-




221. Ryan Collingwood, North Idaho College Professor Charged with Felony Video Voyeurism, Under 
Investigation for Title IX Complaint, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (May 31, 2018, 9:43 PM), https://
www.spokesman.com/stories/2018/may/31/north-idaho-college-professor-faces-charges 
-of-fel [https://perma.cc/S66X-SPBQ]. 
222. Ian Parker, The Story of a Suicide, NEW YORKER (Feb. 6, 2012), https://www.newyorker.com
/magazine/2012/02/06/the-story-of-a-suicide [https://perma.cc/YE33-FZCK]. 
223. Mark Di Ionno, After 6 Years, the End Comes Quickly for Ravi, NJ.COM (Oct. 27, 2016, 12:28 
PM), https://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2016/10/after_6_years_the_end_comes
_quickly_for_ravi_di_io.html [https://perma.cc/UE42-4WVX]. 
224. These Women Hunt Hi-Tech Peeping Toms in South Korea Where Secret Camera Porn Is Rampant, 
S. CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia 
/article/2029041/these-women-hunt-high-tech-peeping-toms-south-korea-where-secret 
[https://perma.cc/Y3QJ-V6G4]. 
225. Keith L. Alexander & Michelle Boorstein, Prosecutors Seek 17-Year Sentence for D.C. Rabbi Con-
victed of Voyeurism, WASH. POST (May 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local
/crime/prosecutors-seek-17-year-sentence-for-dc-rabbi-convicted-of-voyeurism/2015/05/08
/975f5434-f464-11e4-84a6-6d7c67c50db0_story.html [https://perma.cc/W2R6-X8PE]; Jes-
sica Gresko, Appeals Courts Hears Case of Rabbi Who Videotaped Nude Women, BALT. SUN (June 
21, 2016, 11:33 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/bs-md 
-rabbi-arrested-20160621-story.html [https://perma.cc/4XJA-56QT]. The rabbi also hid a 
camera in the bedroom and bathroom of a safe house set up for a domestic-abuse victim and 
taped sexual encounters with women without their permission. Uriel Heilman, New Details 
Show Mikvah-Peeping Rabbi Had Extramarital Sexual Encounters, JEWISH TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY 
(May 12, 2015, 6:24 PM), https://www.jta.org/2015/05/12/united-states/new-details-show 
-mikvah-peeping-rabbi-had-extramarital-sexual-encounters [https://perma.cc/NH29 
-968A]. 





 After the doctor committed suicide, law enforcement 
declined to file criminal charges against anyone working at the hospital.
228
 A 




In some localities, law enforcement has issued warnings about spy cameras 
placed in women’s public restrooms.
230
 In countries like South Korea, hidden 
cameras in women’s restrooms are rampant.
231
 
Voyeurs also trick people into downloading malware (remote access Trojans 
or RATs) onto their laptops, which are often kept in bedrooms. They turn on 
laptops’ cameras and microphones to spy on victims.
232
 Online communities 
known as “ratters” share images of victims whom they refer to as their 
“slaves.”
233
 The victims are often young girls and boys.
234 
According to the Dig-
ital Citizen Alliance, ratters sell “slaved devices” online—and girls’ devices sell 
 
227. Hopkins to Pay $190M to Patients of Gynecologist Who Secretly Videotaped Women, CBS (July 21, 
2014, 1:49 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/johns-hopkins-agrees-to-pay-190-million
-to-patients-of-gynecologist-who-secretly-videotaped-women [https://perma.cc/XNN7 
-PLCZ] [hereinafter Hopkins to Pay $190M] (explaining that investigators discovered 1,200 
videos and 140 images on servers stored in his home). 
228. No Charges in Levy Case, Hopkins Doctor Suspected of Recording Patients, CBS BALT. (Mar. 23, 
2014), https://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2014/03/23/investigation-concluded-into-hopkins 
-gynecologist-suspected-of-recording-patients [https://perma.cc/6CPF-D9W8]. 
229. Hopkins to Pay $190M, supra note 227. 
230. See ‘Spy Hooks’ Raise Alarm About Secret Filming in Public Toilets, STARTS 60 NEWS (Oct. 28, 
2017), https://startsat60.com/news/spy-hooks-raise-alarm-about-secret-filming-in-public 
-toilets [https://perma.cc/JU57-CLT5]. 
231. Tiffany May & Su-Hyun Lee, Is There a Spy Camera in That Bathroom? In Seoul, 8,000 Workers 
Will Check, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/03/world/asia
/korea-toilet-camera.html [https://perma.cc/J25L-7FDH]. In South Korea, the number of 
such incidents jumped over fourfold from 2011 to 2017. Juwon Park & Isabella Steger, South 
Korean Women Aren’t Safe in Public Bathrooms—or Their Homes—Because of Spy-Cam Porn, 
QUARTZ (Aug. 13, 2018) https://qz.com/1354304/south-korean-women-dread-public 
-bathrooms-because-of-spy-cam-porn [https://perma.cc/AQ5J-S43M]. 
232. David Bisson, Attackers Using RATs to “Slave” Victims’ Computers, Sextort Children, TRIPWIRE 
(Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cyber 
-security/attackers-using-rats-to-slave-victims-computers-sextort-children [https://perma
.cc/3N8A-GN4A]. 
233. Nate Anderson, Meet the Men Who Spy on Women Through Their Webcams, ARS TECHNICA 
(Mar. 10, 2013, 8:30 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/03/rat-breeders-meet 
-the-men-who-spy-on-women-through-their-webcams [https://perma.cc/K8QE-6QKE]. 
234. Selling “Slaving”: Outing the Principal Enablers That Profit from Pushing Malware and Put Your 
Privacy at Risk, DIGITAL CITIZENS ALLIANCE 3 (July 2015), https://media.gractions.com
/314A5A5A9ABBBBC5E3BD824CF47C46EF4B9D3A76/07027202-8151-4903-9c40-b6a85037
43aa.pdf [https://perma.cc/NU9J-SXUM] [hereinafter Selling “Slaving”]. 
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for more than boys’ devices.
235
 YouTube features thousands of tutorials on how 
to use and spread RAT malware,
236
 and hackers generate revenue from adver-
tisements featured next to those tutorials.
237
 Although there have been prosecu-




Smart-home technology provides another way to spy on, record, and moni-
tor people in intimate spaces.
239
 According to Erica Olsen, Director of the Na-
tional Network to End Domestic Violence’s Safety Net Project, domestic abusers 
are using home technologies to watch, listen to, and torment their exes.
240
 Net-
worked home gadgets like the Amazon Echo and security cameras are often in-
stalled by men who use cell-phone apps to monitor them.
241




Cyberstalking apps are another spying tool of choice. These apps enable peo-
ple to monitor everything people do and say with their cell phones.
243
 Perpetra-
tors only need to access victims’ phones for a few minutes to install the spying 
app, which leaves no trace of its presence.
244
 They can then view victims’ texts, 
photos, calendars, contacts, and browsing habits in real time.
245
 As I have writ-
ten elsewhere, “[t]argeted phones can be turned into bugging devices; conver-
sations within a fifteen-foot radius of a phone are recorded and uploaded to the 
[app]’s portal.”
246
 It requires very little digging to discover that the goal is stealth 
surveillance of intimates and ex-intimates. Stalking apps are hailed as the “spy 
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240. Bowles, supra note 1. 
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243. Danielle Keats Citron, Spying Inc., 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1243, 1248 (2015) (exploring the 
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sexual privacy 
1913 
Nonetheless, law enforcement has done little to address the problem, despite 
the existence of laws criminalizing wiretapping of electronic communications. 
Federal criminal law and half of the states make it a crime to manufacture, sell, 
or advertise devices primarily used for covert electronic surveillance.
248
 Yet only 
a handful of criminal cases have been brought against stalking-app providers.
249
 
Law enforcement’s lackluster response is partly due to a lack of training on the 
relevant laws and technology necessary to investigate individual perpetrators 
and partly due to social attitudes trivializing domestic violence.
250
 
Although video voyeurism targeting women, girls, and boys is more com-
mon, men are targeted as well. From 2014 to early 2018, Bryan Deneumostier ran 
a subscription-based website called “Straightboyz,” which showed videos of him 
having sex with men.
251
 The site claimed that the videos involved straight men 
who had been tricked into sex.
252
 Deneumostier posted Craigslist ads posing as 
a “bored housewife” interested in anonymous sex.
253
 Men answering the ad were 
told to come to his home where he greeted them dressed as a housewife and told 
them to put on blacked-out goggles or blindfolds.
254
 The men were never told 
that their sexual encounters were being taped and posted online.
255
 Deneumost-
ier was sentenced to three years in prison for secretly videotaping himself having 
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-reportedly-tricked-into-b-1827690421 [https://perma.cc/CDP5-VM4J]. 
254. See David Ovalle, These Men Were Promised Anonymous Sex. They Wound Up on a Porn Site 




256. Jay Weaver, Cross-Dresser Fooled Men, Posted Secret Sex Videos Online. Now, He’s Going to Jail., 
MIAMI HERALD (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/article222533760
.html [https://perma.cc/H3MK-ZCCW]. 
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2. Up-Skirt Photos 
A related development involves the secret recording of women’s breasts and 
genitals while they are in public spaces. People, usually men, surreptitiously take 
photographs of women up their skirts or down their blouses.
257
 Some perpetra-
tors use shoes with hidden cameras and wrist watches with micro lenses to film 
women’s crotches and breasts.
258
 
Much like video voyeurism, “up-skirt” and “down-blouse” photographs vi-
olate sexual privacy by denying victims’ sexual freedom. The privacy invader un-
dermines the victim’s decision to shield her genitalia and breasts from the pub-
lic—consent and sexual autonomy are no longer in victims’ control. When the 
photographs are posted online, victims are reduced to their genitalia and breasts 
and their dignity is violated. 
A famous example of “up-skirt” photos involves actress Emma Watson. A 
member of the paparazzi lay down on the floor and got a photograph up her 
skirt.
259
 After actress Anne Hathaway experienced the same, then-television an-
chor Matt Lauer shamed her on television about it.
260
 
Up-skirt photographs are not just experienced by celebrities. Every day, 
women are targeted on airplanes, the stairs of national monuments, coffee shops, 
 
257. See Clare McGlynn & Julia Downes, We Need a New Law to Combat ‘Upskirting’ and ‘Down-
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CRIM. L. REV. 370; Caitlin Dewey, Even at a National Memorial, No One Is Safe from ‘Creepshots,’ 
WASH. POST (Oct. 10, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp
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TAMPA BAY TIMES (Dec. 12, 2012), https://www.tampabay.com/content/anne-hathaway 
-embarrassed-about-upskirt-photo-slams-door-matt-lauers-face/2101303 [https://perma.cc
/V9ZD-TEM9]; ‘Seen a Lot of You Lately’: Matt Lauer’s Crude Quip to Anne Hathaway as He 








 A Georgia man was caught taking up-skirt photos of a woman in a 
grocery store.
262
 A Massachusetts man was arrested after he took up-skirt photos 
of female subway riders.
263
 Both men, however, evaded legal sanction. Georgia 
and Massachusetts state appellate courts struck down the men’s respective crim-
inal convictions because state criminal laws did not cover up-skirt photos.
264
 
Amidst this legal vacuum, the practice is thriving. Private online forums are 
dedicated to sharing up-skirt videos. When the publication Motherboard accessed 
one of the private forums, a popular site called The Candid Forum, it found thou-
sands of up-skirt images of girls and women, including 4,300 individual threads 




Sextortion generally involves extortion or blackmail carried out online 
through a threat to release sexually explicit images of the victim if the victim does 
not engage in further sexual activity.
266
 The scheme begins when perpetrators 
obtain victims’ nude images either by tricking them into sharing the images
267
 
or by hacking into their computers.
268
 Perpetrators then threaten to distribute 
the nude photos unless victims send more nude photos or perform sexual acts, 
 
261. See McGlynn & Downes, supra note 257; see also Clare McGlynn et al., Beyond ‘Revenge Porn’: 
The Continuum of Image-Based Sexual Abuse, 25 FEM. LEGAL STUD. 25, 32 (2017) (explaining 
how current laws about “revenge porn” fail to address problems like up-skirting). 
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/GU8X-FPRM]. 
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264. Gary v. State, 790 S.E.2d 150, 151 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016); Commonwealth v. Robertson, 5 N.E.3d 
522, 523 (Mass. 2014). 
265. See Joseph Cox, Inside the Private Forums Where Men Illegally Trade Upskirt Photos, MOTHER-
BOARD (May 8, 2018), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/gykxvm 
/upskirt-creepshot-site-the-candid-forum [https://perma.cc/VD6U-A9ZT]. 
266. See Wittes et al., supra note 2, at 11. The Brookings report was the first in the nation to study 
the phenomenon of sextortion. It has played a crucial role not only in raising awareness about 
the problem but also in moving policy makers to consider proposals for a federal statute crim-
inalizing sextortion, based on the statute proposed in the report. 
267. Id. at 3. 
268. See, e.g., id. at 1-2. Jared Abrahams hijacked female victims’ webcams, capturing them un-
dressing in their bedrooms. Selling “Slaving,” supra note 234, at 10-11. One of his victims was 
Cassidy Wolf, Miss Teen USA 2013. Id. Abrahams threatened to post Wolf’s nude photos un-
less she made sexually explicit videos for him. Id. 
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often in front of webcams.
269
 Coerced silence is another aspect of sextortion. Vic-
tims are threatened with further harm if they tell anyone.
270 
Roughly half of vic-
tims do not disclose sextortion to family and friends.
271
 
Sextortion involves the near-total destruction of sexual privacy. The privacy 
invader eliminates victims’ control over their intimate activities and spaces. Per-
petrators take authority over victims’ bodies, instructing them to commit sex-
ually degrading acts and to exhibit their genitalia on videocam. They interfere 
with victims’ ability to retreat in safety to their bedrooms. Although perpetrators 
have no prior relationship with victims, their torment makes it difficult for vic-
tims to trust intimates in the future. 
Perpetrators, who are almost always male, have dozens or even hundreds of 
victims.
272
 Most of the victims are female,
273
 including nearly all of the adult 
victims
274
 and many underage victims.
275
 
To get a sense of the damage inflicted, consider the following cases. Benja-
min Jenkins demanded that victims—girls between the ages of 12 and 16—record 
themselves drinking their urine and licking toilets.
276
 He also ordered victims to 
watch him masturbate.
277
 Luis Mijangos tricked hundreds of women and teen-
age girls into downloading malware onto their computers.
278
 He turned on vic-
tims’ webcams to record them undressing. Once Mijangos obtained victims’ 
 
269. See What Is Sextortion?, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/video-repository/newss-what-is 
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AGAINST CHILD. RES. CTR. U.N.H. 79 (June 2016), https://rems.ed.gov/Docs 
/SextortionFindingsSurvey.pdf [https://perma.cc/2LHR-M2VW]. 
272. Wittes et al., supra note 2, at 4. Lucas Michael Chansler sextorted nearly 350 victims. Id. at 18. 
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276. U.S. Attorney’s Office, N. Dist. of Ga., Mableton Man Charged in Sextortion of Young Girls, U.S. 
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-sextortion-young-girls [https://perma.cc/6K7E-8K8V]. 
277. Id. 
278. Wittes et al., supra note 2, at 1-2. 
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nude images, he emailed them demands for more. He coerced numerous victims 
into performing sex acts for him on camera and sending him nude images.
279
 
The difference in the treatment of perpetrators who target minors and those 
who target adults is staggering. Anton Martynenko tricked 155 boys into sending 
him nude photos and then extorted more.
280
 He received a thirty-eight-year sen-
tence for producing and distributing child pornography.
281
 Michael Ford hacked 
into the computers of hundreds of adult women to obtain sexually explicit im-
ages.
282
 Via email, Ford ordered at least seventy-five victims to send him videos 
of “‘sexy girls’ undressing in changing rooms at pools, gyms and clothing 
stores.”
283
 He threatened to release the victims’ nude photos unless they com-
plied with his demands. When victims failed to comply, Ford escalated his 
threats, in one instance saying he would post the victim’s contact information 
and photographs on an “escort/hooker website.” Occasionally he followed 
through on his threats, sending victims’ nude photos to their family members 
and friends.
284
 Ford was sentenced to just fifty-seven months in prison.
285
 
4. Nonconsensual Pornography 
Nonconsensual pornography “involves the distribution of sexually graphic 
images of individuals without their consent.”
286
 Sometimes, perpetrators obtain 
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PM EST), https://money.cnn.com/2016/05/11/technology/brookings-institution-sextortion
-study [https://perma.cc/U794-TMEP]. For an example of sextortion of a single victim, see 
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the nude images without subjects’ permission.
287
 Ford stole nude images from 
victims’ computers and distributed the images after the victims refused to share 
more.
288
 To take another example, a college student alleged she was secretly 
taped having sex with her boyfriend.
289
 She said the boyfriend then showed the 
video at a fraternity meeting and texted it to his friends.
290
 In yet another inci-
dent, a hacker obtained photographs of a hundred female actresses from their 
Apple iCloud accounts, including images of Gabrielle Union.
291
 
In other cases, perpetrators obtain the nude images with consent, usually in 
the context of an intimate relationship. The images are then distributed without 
consent.
292
 That practice is popularly referred to as “revenge porn.”
293
 In the col-
lege student’s case, her boyfriend allegedly distributed the sex video he made 
without her permission and also distributed nude images she shared with him 
in confidence, also without her consent.
294
 The boyfriend uploaded the nude im-
ages to a Facebook page called “Dog Pound,” where members of his fraternity 
posted videos and images of sexual “conquests.”
295
 
Nonconsensual pornography invades sexual privacy by preventing victims 
from determining for themselves who sees them naked. Gabrielle Union de-
scribed the hacker’s theft and posting of her nude photo online as destroying her 
“power” over her body, much as the bodies of black women have long been “open 
for public consumption.”
296
 Nude photos, posted for the public to see, reduce 
people to their genitalia and breasts. When nonconsensual pornography is per-
petrated by an ex-intimate, the betrayal of trust is profound. 
Consider the experience of Holly Jacobs. Jacobs shared sexually explicit im-
ages and videos with her boyfriend.
297
 The images and videos were for their eyes 
only.
298
 After their break-up, her ex betrayed her trust, posting the photos and 
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videos on hundreds of revenge-porn sites, porn sites, and adult-finder sites.
299
 
He also sent her nude photos to her boss.
300
 
For months, local law enforcement refused to help Jacobs, incorrectly claim-
ing that harassment was a “civil” matter in her state.
301
 At the urging of her Sen-
ator’s office, the state attorney’s office took up the case, charging her ex with 
misdemeanor harassment.
302
 Nonetheless, the charges were dropped after her ex 
claimed that he had been hacked.
303
 Prosecutors told Jacobs that they could not 
justify obtaining a warrant to investigate a misdemeanor.
304
 The prosecutors 
simply did not think the abuse was serious enough to expend investigative re-
sources.
305
 At the time, Jacobs’s home state did not have a law criminalizing the 
practice of nonconsensual pornography, something she helped changed after her 
criminal case was dropped.
306
 
Nonconsensual porn affects women and girls far more frequently than it af-
fects men and boys.
307
 According to recent studies, the majority of victims are 
female,
308
 and young women are particularly likely to experience threats to post 
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 Nevertheless, men and boys are also victims of nonconsen-
sual pornography.
310
 Ari Waldman has conducted empirical studies about the 
prevalence of nonconsensual pornography among gay men.
311
 Photos of men’s 
genitalia have been posted online in cases involving revenge porn.
312
 
Individuals who identify as sexual minorities are more likely than heterosex-
ual individuals to experience threats of, or actual, nonconsensual pornogra-
phy.
313
 Research shows that 3% of Americans who use the internet have had 
someone threaten to post their nude photos, while 2% have had someone do it.
314
 
Those numbers jump considerably—to 15% and 7%, respectively—among les-
bian, gay, and bisexual individuals.
315
 
The perpetrators are often male, but not always. For instance, in 2016, Dani 
Mathers, a female model for Playboy, secretly took a photograph of a seventy-
year-old woman while she was taking a shower in her health club’s locker 
room.
316
 She sent the photograph to her Snapchat followers, expressing her dis-
gust for the elderly woman’s aging body with the tagline, “If I can’t unsee this 
then you can’t either.”
317
 At that time, nonconsensual pornography was a mis-
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demeanor in her state.
318




5. Deep-Fake Sex Videos 
Machine-learning technologies are being used to create “deep-fake” sex vid-
eos—where people’s faces and voices are inserted into real pornography.
320
 
Deep-fake technology enables the creation of impersonations out of digital 
whole cloth.
321
 The end result is realistic-looking video or audio that is increas-
ingly difficult to debunk.
322
 
Deep-fake sex videos are different from the nonconsensual disclosure of in-
timate images because they do not actually depict a victim’s naked body. Yet even 
though deep-fake sex videos do not depict featured individuals’ actual genitals, 
breasts, buttocks, and anuses, they hijack people’s sexual and intimate identities. 
Much like nonconsensual pornography, deep-fake sex videos exercise dominion 
over people’s sexuality, exhibiting it to others without consent. They reduce in-
dividuals to genitalia, breasts, buttocks, and anuses, creating a sexual identity 
not of the individual’s own making. They are an affront to the sense that people’s 
intimate identities are their own to share or to keep to themselves. 
A Subreddit (since closed) featured deep-fake sex videos of female celebri-
ties, amassing more than 100,000 users.
323
 One such video featured Gal Gadot 
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Deep-fake sex videos have also featured the likenesses of Scarlett Johansson, Tay-
lor Swift, and Maisie Williams.
325
 
The capacity to generate deep fakes is spreading rapidly.
326
 There are widely 
available desktop tools that anyone can access to create realistic face swapping 
videos, and easily-accessible tutorials that explain how to use these tools.
327
 The 
technology is now in the hands of all manner of people who want to exploit and 
distort others’ sexual identities. 
Ex-intimates have seized upon the deep-fake trend. As one Reddit user 
asked, “I want to make a porn video with my ex-girlfriend. But I don’t have any 
high-quality video with her, but I have lots of good photos.”
328
 A Discord user 
explained that he made a “pretty good” video of a girl he went to high school 




Female journalists have been targeted with deep-fake sex videos. A deep fake 
of Indian investigative journalist Rana Ayyub went viral after she wrote about 
corruption in Hindu nationalist politics.
330
 The abuse began with tweets imper-
sonating Ayyub, saying she supports child rape and hates Indians.
331
 A two-mi-
nute fake pornographic video then appeared with Ayyub’s face morphed onto 
another woman’s body.
332
 Thousands of people shared the deep-fake sex video 
on Twitter and Facebook and in WhatsApp groups.
333
 Ayyub’s social media no-
tifications were filled with snippets of the video next to comments demanding 
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333. ‘I Couldn’t Talk or Sleep for Three Days’: Journalist Rana Ayyub’s Horrific Social Media Ordeal  




sex and threatening gang rape.
334
 Tweets with her home address, phone number, 
and photograph circulated widely.
335
 Most of the posters identified themselves 
as fans of the politicians she discussed in her reporting.
336
 As one poster wrote, 
“See, Rana, what we spread about you; this is what happens when you write lies 
about Modi and Hindus in India.”
337
 
Noelle Martin was an eighteen-year-old student in Australia when photos 
from her social-media profiles were inserted into images of people having sex. 
Soon, her face was swapped into porn videos featuring her being ejaculated on 
and having oral sex.
338
 The photos and videos appeared next to her name and 
home address.
339
 All could be easily found in searches of Martin’s name.
340
 
Martin went to law enforcement and was told that nothing could be done.
341
 
She could not afford to hire a lawyer.
342
 She asked site operators to take down 
the videos. One site operator responded with a sextortion attempt, saying that 
he would take down the deep-fake sex video if she sent him nude photos.
343
 








338. Cara Curtis, Deepfakes Are Being Weaponized to Silence Women—but This Woman Is Fighting 
Back, NEXT WEB (Oct. 5, 2018), https://thenextweb.com/code-word/2018/10/05/deepfakes 
-are-being-weaponized-to-silence-women-but-this-woman-is-fighting-back [https://
perma.cc/BB4H-YL44]; TEDx Talks, Sexual Predators Edited My Photos into Porn—How I 
Fought Back | Noelle Martin | TEDxPerth, YOUTUBE (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=PctUS31px40. 
339. Ally Foster, Teen’s Google Search Reveals Sickening Online Secret About Herself, NEWS.COM.AU 
(June 30, 2018), https://www.news.com.au/technology/online/security/teens-google 
-search-reveals-sickening-online-secret-about-herself/news-story/ee9d26010989c4b9a5c63
33013ebbef2 [https://perma.cc/T2DD-LEWV]. 
340. Curtis, supra note 338. 
341. Foster, supra note 339. 
342. TEDx Talks, supra note 338. 
343. Jake Sturmer & Alison Branley, Noelle Martin Fights to Have Harmless Selfie Removed from 
‘Parasite’ Porn Sites, ABC NEWS (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-10-12
/womans-fight-to-have-harmless-selfie-removed-from-porn-site/7924948 [https://perma
.cc/HS4Q-HYJN]. 
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These examples highlight the gendered dimension of deep-fake sex videos. 
Thus far, most, if not all, victims of deep-fake sex videos are female. One can 
imagine deep-fake videos featuring someone being raped. For women, the threat 
of rape is all too real.
345
 Deep-fake sex videos bring that threat alive in a visceral 
way. 
C. Harm 
The harm of sexual-privacy invasions is profound. Victims are denied agency 
over their intimate lives. Sextortion victims are forced to insert objects into their 
orifices, masturbate on command, and create sexually explicit images.
346
 Like the 
silencing that domestic-violence victims have long endured, victims are forced 
to hide the abuse from people who could help them.
347
 
Developing intimate relationships is difficult after one’s sexual privacy has 
been invaded. After realizing that her ex’s gifts contained recording devices, a 
woman had “recurrent and intrusive thoughts of being exposed and violated, 
interference with her personal relationships, [and] feelings of vulnerability and 
mistrust.”
348
 She explained that she “lives in a perpetual state of fear that some-
one is watching or spying on her and . . . does not feel safe anywhere.”
349
 Sports 
journalist Erin Andrews echoed these sentiments after a stalker secretly taped 
her undressing in a hotel room and then posted the video online.
350
 Holly Jacobs 





344. 2019 WA Young Australian of the Year: Ms. Noelle Martin, AUSTRALIAN YEAR AWARDS, https://
www.australianoftheyear.org.au/honour-roll/?view=fullView&recipientID=2035 [https://
perma.cc/D6QV-AM5T]; TEDx Talks, supra note 338. 
345. For examples of online assaultive incidents and their effects on women, see Citron, supra note 
215, at 64-65, 69-72, 75-76. 
346. Jurecic, supra note 270; Wittes et al., supra note 2, at 1-5, 10-23. 
347. Jurecic, supra note 270. 
348. Welsh v. Martinez, 114 A.3d 1231, 1244 (Conn. App. Ct. 2015). 
349. Id. at 1242. 
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Victims experience visceral fear. As one of Mijangos’s victims explained, “He 
haunts me every time I use the computer.”
352
 A woman who was secretly video-
taped by the Johns Hopkins gynecologist said, “I can’t bring myself to go back. 




The posting of nude images without consent and deep-fake sex videos can 
lead to a single aspect of one’s self eclipsing one’s personhood.
354
 Sex organs and 
sexuality stand in for the whole of one’s identity,
355
 without the self-determined 
boundaries that protect us from being simplified and judged out of context.
356
 
One of Deneumostier’s victims told me: “[E]very day I walk outside my home 
with the experience in the back of mind, haunting me with every look I receive 
from a stranger passing by, thinking to myself if they recognize me. It frightens 
me like nothing else could.”
357
 
Sexual-privacy invasions reduce victims to sexual objects that can be ex-
ploited and exposed. Like Robin West’s description of threats of sexual violence, 
sexual-privacy invasions are experienced like physical penetrations of the 
body.
358




Sometimes sexual-privacy invasions are so destructive to identity that indi-
viduals have to change their names. After Jacobs’s sexually graphic photos and 
videos appeared prominently in searches of her name, her supervisor urged her 
to change her name. She did.
360
 
When the nude images of women and sexual minorities are posted online 
without consent, these individuals may be stigmatized. As Martha Nussbaum 
explains, the “universal human discomfort with bodily reality” often works to 
 
352. Wittes et al., supra note 2, at 24. 
353. Hopkins to Pay $190M, supra note 227. 
354. ROSEN, supra note 79, at 20 (arguing that the exposure of the fact that Monica Lewinsky sent 
President Clinton a book about phone sex allowed her to be defined by a single aspect of 
herself—her sexuality—and let her be judged out of context, amounting to an invasion of her 
privacy). 
355. See id. 
356. See id. 
357. E-mail from John Doe to Danielle Citron (Dec. 12, 2018) (on file with author). 
358. ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 103 (1997). 
359. Wittes et al., supra note 2, at 23. 
360. CITRON, supra note 12, at 48. 
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undermine women and minorities.
361
 The “body of the gay man has been a cen-
tral locus of disgust-anxiety—above all, for other men.”
362
 The same is often true 
of displays of women’s nude bodies as well.
363
 Misogyny, racism, and homopho-
bia, often a toxic brew, underlie the stigmatization.
364
 
Recall that the boyfriend’s nonconsensual taping of his sexual encounter 
with the novelist made the woman feel deeply ashamed and embarrassed.
365
 
Ayyub experienced the deep-fake sex video as humiliating, shaming, and silenc-
ing.
366
 She saw it as an effort to “break” her by defining her as a “‘promiscuous,’ 
‘immoral’ woman.”
367
 Martin felt “physically sick, disgusted, angry, degraded, 




The emotional harm is severe and lasting, and the psychological distress can 
be overwhelming.
369
 Victims have difficulty concentrating, eating, and work-
ing.
370
 They experience anxiety and depression. They contemplate suicide. As 
one of Deneumostier’s victims said, there have been “times I wouldn’t eat and 
days in which I would not leave my room.”
371
 Union explained that she “felt 
extreme anxiety, [and] a complete loss of control.”
372
 Ayyub wrote that she 
“wanted to vomit and fought tears” upon first seeing the fake pornographic im-
age of herself.
373
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Eaton et al., supra note 307. 
370. Interview with Jane Doe, supra note 124. 
371. E-mail from John Doe, supra note 357.  
372. Pesta, supra note 49. 
373. Ayyub, supra note 330. 
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Minors are particularly vulnerable to depression and suicide. Two boys killed 
themselves in the Martynenko sextortion case.
375
 Clementi killed himself.
376
 Fif-
teen-year-old Audrie Pott hanged herself after a photo of her topless went vi-
ral.
377
 Fifteen-year-old Amanda Todd took her own life after a stranger con-
vinced her to reveal her breasts on a webcam and created a Facebook page with 
the picture.
378
 Just before killing herself, she posted a video on YouTube explain-




There is a significant risk to victims’ job prospects. Search results matter to 
employers.
380
 According to a Microsoft study, nearly eighty percent of employers 
use search results to make decisions about candidates, and in around seventy 
percent of cases, those results have a negative impact.
381
 As another study ex-
plained, employers often decline to interview or hire people because their search 
results featured “unsuitable photos.”
382
 The reason for those results should be 
obvious. It is less risky and expensive to hire people who do not have damaged 
online reputations.
383
 Because employers consult search results and because data 
 
375. Hawkins, supra note 280. 
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378. Michelle Dean, The Story of Amanda Todd, NEW YORKER (Oct. 18, 2012), https://www
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perma.cc/7T82-4KJZ]. 
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CareerBuilder Study, CAREERBUILDER (June 15, 2017), https://press 
.careerbuilder.com/2017-06-15-Number-of-Employers-Using-Social-Media-to-Screen 
-Candidates-at-All-Time-High-Finds-Latest-CareerBuilder-Study [https://perma.cc/VYT7
-RDJX]; see also Erica Swallow, How Recruiters Use Social Networks to Screen Candidates, MASH-
ABLE (Oct. 23, 2011), https://mashable.com/2011/10/23/how-recruiters-use-social-networks 
-to-screen-candidates-infographic/#4MxjdIksVaqr [https://perma.cc/J25D-XL6Q]. 
381. See CITRON, supra note 12, at 8; Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 352-53. 
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/guides/DPD_Online-Reputation-Research_overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/F2SL 
-UUNW]. 
383. See id. 
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brokers integrate online posts into their dossiers, sexual-privacy invasions “be-




Companies may refuse to interview or hire women and minorities because 
their search results include nude images or deep-fake sex videos.
385
 Social norms 
about sexual modesty and gender stereotypes explain why women and minori-
ties are more likely to suffer harm in the job market than heterosexual white men. 
Women—and especially nonwhite women—may be perceived as immoral sluts 
for engaging in sexual activity.
386
 Nude images evoke the pernicious view of 
black women as sexually deviant.
387
 Similarly, black men are subject to racist ste-
reotypes about their sexuality, and LGBTQ individuals are subject to the stereo-
type of being “promiscuous, sex-driven, and predatory.”
388
 All of this “margin-
alizes and otherizes”
389
 women and minorities, and raises the risk of unfair 
treatment.
 
Annie Seifullah’s experience is illustrative. Seifullah was a school principal in 
New York City when her ex-boyfriend uploaded stolen sexually explicit photo-
graphs of her to a Department of Education laptop and sent them to the school 
superintendent and the New York Post.
390
 The city initially demoted her and then 
suspended her for a year without pay.
391
 The explanation was that she brought 
“widespread negative publicity, ridicule and notoriety” to the school system and 
failed to safeguard her work computer from her abusive ex-boyfriend.
392
 
i i i .  law and markets 
Law and markets shape, and are shaped by, social norms. This Part lays out 
opportunities and challenges for law and markets to protect sexual privacy. It 
first suggests legal reforms for penalizing sexual-privacy invasions and enhanc-
ing penalties for bias-motivated abuse. Yet law cannot address all sexual-privacy 
 
384. COHEN, supra note 37, at 144. 
385. See CITRON, supra note 12, at 181-85. 
386. Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 353. 
387. See BRIDGES, supra note 27, at 54; Roberts, supra note 62, at 1438-39. 
388. Waldman, supra note 311 (manuscript at 19). 
389. Id. 







invasions, nor would we want it to. With this in mind, the Part also explores the 
potential for market-based approaches to protecting sexual privacy. 
A. Law’s Role 
Traditional privacy law is ill-equipped to address some of today’s sexual-pri-
vacy invasions. This is hardly surprising. After all, privacy law’s roots trace back 
to the nineteenth century and have been developed in an incremental way.
393
 
This Section sketches existing legal protections and gaps in the law, and suggests 
a legislative approach to sexual privacy. 
1. Traditional Law 
Before reviewing the prospects for traditional theories of liability, it is im-
portant to acknowledge some threshold problems for any legal approach. These 
involve the identification of perpetrators, jurisdiction over foreign defendants, 
the resource constraints of victims, privacy risks of civil suits, and the immunity 
afforded to content platforms. 
First, law cannot deter, redress, or punish perpetrators if they cannot be iden-
tified.
394
 Attribution can be difficult, especially if perpetrators go to lengths to 
hide their digital tracks.
395
 Moreover, some perpetrators live outside the United 
States and thus are beyond the reach of U.S. process. Private plaintiffs will have 
great difficulty suing foreign defendants.
396
 However, with its investigative ca-




Yet even if perpetrators can be identified and live in the United States, civil 
suits and criminal prosecutions require significant resources. For victims inter-
 
393. See Citron, supra note 24 (exploring how privacy torts were stunted by William Prosser’s ar-
ticulation of privacy-tort law as four torts, which are not well designed for data-security prob-
lems). The privacy torts were conceptualized by nineteenth-century men of wealth and 
power. See Allen & Mack, supra note 17, at 441-42. Twentieth-century judicial decisions re-
flected “gendered notions of female modesty that suggested women were vulnerable and in 
need of protection.” Skinner-Thompson, Privacy’s Double Standards, supra note 11, at 2079. 
394. Citron, supra note 215, at 117. 
395. CITRON, supra note 12, at 165. 
396. Chesney & Citron, supra note 4 (manuscript at 34). 
397. Id. (manuscript at 42). 
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ested in suing perpetrators, this is frustrating—most, unfortunately, cannot af-
ford to hire a lawyer.
398
 Law enforcement may be unwilling to expend scarce 
resources on combating sexual-privacy invasions. Although some state attorneys 
general, local district attorneys, and federal prosecutors have devoted significant 
energy to prosecuting sexual-privacy invasions, far more have not.
399
 Only ex-
treme cases are likely to attract law enforcement’s attention. 
Another wrinkle is that plaintiffs in civil court generally have to proceed un-
der their real names, and so victims may be reluctant to sue for fear of unleashing 
more unwanted publicity.
400
 Courts often “disfavor pseudonymous litigation be-
cause it is assumed to interfere with the transparency of the judicial process.”
401
 
Arguments in favor of Jane Doe lawsuits are considered against the presumption 




Many victims decline to bring civil suits because they do not want to expose 
their lives to their attackers any further. As David Bateman and Elisa D’Amico 
(who represent victims of nonconsensual pornography on a pro bono basis) have 
 
398. There are some bright spots for plaintiffs—law firms like K&L Gates devote significant pro 
bono resources to seeking redress for victims of nonconsensual pornography. Partners David 
Bateman and Elisa D’Amico are spearheading this effort. See Matthew Goldstein, Law Firm 
Founds Project to Fight ‘Revenge Porn,’ N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Jan. 29, 2015, 7:47 PM), https://
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lawyers like Carrie Goldberg and Erica Johnstone who specialize in sexual-privacy invasions. 
See Margaret Talbot, The Attorney Fighting Revenge Porn, NEW YORKER (Dec. 5, 2016) (profil-
ing Carrie Goldberg), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/12/05/the-attorney 
-fighting-revenge-porn [https://perma.cc/Y3SE-477S]. Yet these talented attorneys can take 
on only so many cases—they cannot handle the demand alone. 
399. Former California Attorney General (now U.S. Senator and presidential candidate) Kamala 
Harris was a noted exception, see Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State At-
torneys General, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 765-67 (2016), as is the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice’s Computer Crimes and Intellectual Property Section in Washington, D.C., with Assistant 
U.S. Attorney Mona Sedky as a shining example, see Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, 
The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans Section 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 401, 407 n.52 (2017). 
400. CITRON, supra note 12, at 122. 
401. Id. at 162. 
402. Id. The Uniform Civil Remedies for Unauthorized Disclosure of Intimate Images Act would 
permit plaintiffs to bring suits under pseudonyms to protect their identity and privacy from 
further harm. UNIFORM CIVIL REMEDIES FOR UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF INTIMATE IM-
AGES ACT § 5(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018). 
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explained, victims often dread the exposure that discovery inevitably entails.
403
 
They do not want their medical records revealed to their attackers.
404
 They are 
anxious about sitting across from their abusers during a deposition.
405
 It is not 
hard to see why individuals decline to sue sexual-privacy invaders. And even if 
victims are not deterred by litigation’s privacy risks, they may find it hard to 
justify suing someone who is effectively judgment proof. 
The other logical option for redress is to sue content platforms. Logical, yes; 
possible, no. Twenty years ago, Congress gave platforms a broad liability shield 
for user-generated content in the form of section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act.
406
 Thus, the parties in the best position to minimize potential 
harm—content platforms—have no legal incentive to intervene, and plaintiffs 




These obstacles are significant, but they are not fatal. If an individual is able 
and willing to bring suit, or if law enforcement is ready to devote resources to 
the matter, the next question is whether existing law provides an effective means 
of redress. 
a. Criminal Law 
Criminal law can and should prevent and punish certain sexual-privacy in-
vasions.
408
 Criminal penalties would signal the significant harm that such inva-
sions inflict.
409
 The criminal law approach suggested below accords with the 
long-standing recognition that the coerced visibility of the human body can be 
as destructive as an assault on the body. As Justice Gray wrote in 1891, “The in-
violability of the person is as much invaded by a compulsory stripping and ex-
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409. See generally Citron, supra note 14, at 404-14 (arguing that legal sanctions have an important 
role in detrivializing certain types of harm). 
410. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 252 (1891). 
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Before turning to suggestions for legislative reform, what existing state and 
federal laws can be invoked to tackle the problem? State video-voyeurism laws 
punish the nonconsensual recording of individuals in a state of undress in places 
where they can reasonably expect privacy.
411
 In New York, for example, it is a 
crime to record a person undressing or having sex without that person’s consent 
if that person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.
412
 The federal Video Voy-
eurism Prevention Act of 2004 penalizes a person who intentionally “capture[s] 
an image of a private area of an individual without their consent, and knowingly 
does so under circumstances in which the individual has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy.”
413
 The statute, however, only applies to images taken on federal 
property.
414
 Most states and the federal government criminalize surreptitious 
wiretapping of private communications.
415
 
The nonconsensual disclosure of intimate images has been the subject of re-
cent legislation. Thanks to advocates and policy makers, forty-two states and the 
District of Columbia now ban the nonconsensual distribution of nude images.
416
 
And bills have been proposed in both the Senate and the House of Representa-
tives that criminalize the disclosure of someone’s intimate images without con-
sent.
417
 However, as I will explore below, many of these state laws are overly 
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cording Guide, REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM PRESS 2 (2012), https://www.rcfp.org
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Twelve states, however, criminalize the interception of electronic communications unless all 
parties to the communication consent to the interceptions. See Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of 
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416. See 42 States + DC Now Have Revenge Porn Laws, CYBER C.R. INITIATIVE, https://www 
.cybercivilrights.org/revenge-porn-laws [https://perma.cc/J5Z8-Q7ZW]. 
417. See, e.g., H.R. 4472, 115th Cong. (2017); S. 2162, 115th Cong. (2017). The original House Bill 
was conceptualized and drafted by Mary Anne Franks, who authored the first model statute 
and whose tireless work and advocacy has led to the wave of state laws criminalizing the prac-
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Only two states criminalize the taking of up-skirt photos.
419
 As the next Sec-
tion shows, state courts have been reluctant to extend existing video-voyeurism 
laws to up-skirt practices. As for deep-fake sex videos, a handful of criminal stat-
utes are potentially relevant. Several states make it a crime to knowingly and 
credibly impersonate another person online with intent to “harm[], intimi-
dat[e], threaten[], or defraud[]” the person.
420
 In certain jurisdictions, creators 
of deep-fake sex videos only face charges for criminal defamation if they knew 
the videos were fake when they posted them or if they were reckless as to the 
truth or falsity of the videos.
421
 
b. Civil Law 
Tort law could provide redress for sexual-privacy invasions, particularly if 
they involve spaces traditionally understood as private, like homes. The most 
relevant body of tort law is the privacy torts, including intrusion on seclusion, 
public disclosure of private fact, false light, and appropriation of identity.
422
 
The intrusion tort applies to invasions of someone’s “private place” or pri-
vate affairs in a manner that is “offensive and objectionable” to the reasonable 
person.
423
 In Hamberger v. Eastman, the New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld 
 
tice and proposed federal laws. For instance, when we first started writing about nonconsen-
sual pornography, there were six laws criminalizing the practice. See Citron & Franks, supra 
note 3, at 371. Now, thanks to Franks’s work, there are forty-three laws on the books and 
proposed federal statutes. I have been working with Senator Kamala Harris’s office on the 
Senate version of the bill as well as with Congresswoman Jackie Speier’s office on the House 
version that Franks authored. 
418. See infra Section III.A.2. 
419. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 105(b) (West 2014); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-386.1(A)(ii) 
(2014). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals struck down a poorly drafted, overbroad up-
skirt statute, finding it “paternalistic” and unconstitutional. Ex parte Thompson, 442 S.W.3d 
325, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); see Callie Beusman, ‘Paternalistic’ Law Banning Upskirt Photos 
Thrown Out by Texas Court, JEZEBEL (Sept. 18, 2014, 6:10 PM), https://jezebel.com 
/paternalistic-law-banning-upskirt-photos-thrown-out-by-1636505597 [https://perma.cc
/5F95-EK8M]. 
420. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 528.5(a) (West 2018). 
421. See Eugene Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, Criminal Harassment Laws, 
and “Cyberstalking,” 107 NW. U. L. REV. 731, 752-53 (2013) (discussing the possibility of defa-
mation or libel charges for sexual harassment cases involving impersonation). 
422. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
423. Id. at 395-96. 
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an intrusion claim against a peeping landlord who spied on a married couple in 
their bedroom.
424
 The tort generally applies to the secret watching and recording 
of individuals at home and on their personal devices.
425
 It protects against the 
coerced invasion of people’s bedrooms and bodies, as in the case of sextortion 
and video voyeurism. However, because the intrusions involve physical spaces 
recognized as private and whose invasion would highly offend the reasonable 
person, the intrusion tort has no application to deep-fake sex videos and may 
not be useful in cases involving up-skirt photos, as discussed in the next Section. 
The disclosure tort involves the publication of private, nonnewsworthy in-
formation that would highly offend the reasonable person. Nude photos pub-
lished online without consent provide strong grounds for disclosure claims. We 
learn little newsworthy information from seeing a person’s genitals, breasts, but-
tocks, or anus. Naked body parts do not teach us anything about culture, art, or 
politics. This is true whether the body parts belong to famous or nonfamous 
individuals.
426
 For that reason, nude photos are widely understood as nonnews-




Both the false-light tort—recklessly creating a harmful and false implication 
about someone—and defamation have potential purchase for deep-fake sex vid-
eos. The appropriation tort might apply as well, though many jurisdictions cabin 
 
424. 206 A.2d 239, 240-42 (N.H. 1964). However, we saw in the Plaxico case, see supra text accom-
panying notes 213-214, that a court overcame the default presumption that bedrooms are pri-
vate spaces in admitting photographs taken of a woman and her lesbian lover in bed as evi-
dence in a child-custody hearing. Plaxico v. Michael, 735 So. 2d 1036, 1039-40 (Miss. 1999). 
The majority went to great pains to say that it would have reached the same conclusion if the 
ex-wife had been engaged in sex with a man. Id. Reading between the lines, however, it was 
clear that the majority thought that gay sex did not deserve privacy because it could have 
endangered the child. See Allen, supra note 43, at 1725. The private home “is not a sanctuary 
for intimate sex for LGBT individuals where courts view homosexual relationships as illicit.” 
Id. 
425. See, e.g., Welsh v. Martinez, 114 A.3d 1231 (Conn. App. Ct. 2015) (upholding a two-million-
dollar jury award in a privacy-tort action where the defendant ex-boyfriend planted spying 
devices in the plaintiff’s bedroom, including in clock radios and the television); In re Marriage 
of Tigges, 758 N.W.2d 824, 829 (Iowa 2008) (finding legally viable a claim against the de-
fendant husband for surreptitiously filming his wife in their home); Lewis v. LeGrow, 670 
N.W.2d 675 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (upholding a verdict for the plaintiffs where the defendant 
ex-boyfriend made secret videos of them having sex). 
426. Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 379-80; see also RICHARDS, supra note 37, at 58-64, 159. The 
tort likely would not apply to disclosures related to matters of public importance, such as a 
politician running for office who claims to have stopped sending nude photos to strangers. 
See CITRON, supra note 12, at 151. 
427. See CITRON, supra note 12, at 121. 
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the tort to cases where people’s images are being used for commercial purposes, 
and most perpetrators earn nothing from deep-fake sex videos or nonconsensual 
pornography. By contrast, some content platforms make a business out of them 
but are mostly immune from liability for their posting.
428
 
Another tort that would be an effective tool against sexual-privacy invasions 
is intentional infliction of emotional distress. It requires proof of “extreme and 
outrageous conduct” by a defendant who intended to cause, or recklessly caused, 
the plaintiff’s “severe” emotional distress.
429
 Sexual-privacy invasions have sup-
ported emotional-distress claims. In a recent case involving nonconsensual por-
nography, the plaintiff, who was represented by Bateman and D’Amico of the 
Cyber Civil Rights Legal Project, was awarded $6.4 million, though the plaintiff 




In addition to torts, copyright law may also provide an effective tool in sex-
ual-privacy cases involving the distribution of intimate images created by vic-
tims. Because § 230 does not immunize websites from federal intellectual prop-
erty claims,
431
 victims could file notice and takedown requests with content 
platforms after registering the copyright of their images. Content platforms 
would then have to take down the photographs promptly or face monetary dam-
ages under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
432
 Some platforms, however, 





428. Chesney & Citron, supra note 4 (manuscript at 35). 
429. CITRON, supra note 12, at 121. 
430. Christine Hauser, $6.4 Million Judgment in Revenge Porn Case Is Among Largest Ever, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/us/revenge-porn-california
.html [https://perma.cc/66VU-8XQY]. Bateman and D’Amico discussed this aspect of the 
case with my information privacy law class at Fordham Law School in the fall of 2018. Bate-
man & D’Amico, supra note 403. 
431. Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 359-60. Some deep-fake sex videos exploit copyrighted con-
tent that the plaintiff created herself, but the harm isn’t about property—it is about sexual 
privacy. Moreover, the prospects for success are uncertain because defendants will surely argue 
that the fake is a “fair use” of the copyrighted material and sufficiently transformed from the 
original so as to elude copyright protection. Chesney & Citron, supra note 4 (manuscript at 
35). 
432. Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 359-60. 
433. CITRON, supra note 12, at 122. 
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c. First Amendment Concerns 
First Amendment objections from perpetrators are most likely to arise in 
cases involving the nonconsensual disclosure of real or deep-fake nude images 
or sex videos. Such objections are weak, however—especially with a well-crafted 
statute like the one that Mary Anne Franks has proposed.
434
 Nude images posted 
without consent involve the narrow set of circumstances when the publication 
of truthful information can be proscribed civilly and criminally.
435
 
The Vermont Supreme Court recently upheld the state’s statute criminaliz-
ing nonconsensual pornography, holding that the law survived strict scrutiny 
analysis.
436
 The court emphasized that “[f]rom a constitutional perspective, it is 
hard to see a distinction between laws prohibiting nonconsensual disclosure of 
personal information comprising images of nudity and sexual conduct and those 
prohibiting disclosure of other categories of nonpublic personal information,” 
such as health data.
437
 The court noted that the state’s argument that the statute 
covered “extreme invasions of privacy” that are categorically unprotected speech 




434. See Mary Anne Franks, Drafting an Effective “Revenge Porn” Law: A Guide for Legislators 
(Aug. 17, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2468823. I—along 
with Franks—have written extensively about the First Amendment and free speech values im-
plicated in regulating nonconsensual pornography. See, e.g., CITRON, supra note 12, at 207-12; 
Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 374-86; Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 46, at 
1308-23 (carefully exploring all of the potential free speech concerns raised by the proscription 
of nonconsensual pornography); Danielle Citron, More Thoughts on How to Write a Constitu-
tional Revenge Porn Law, FORBES (May 23, 2015, 12:34 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/daniellecitron/2015/05/23/more-thoughts-on-how-to-write-a-constitutional-revenge-porn
-law [https://perma.cc/G7D3-83R2]. 
435. Mary Anne Franks and I are not alone in this position—we are joined by Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Neil Richards, and Eugene Volokh in arguing that nonconsensual porn can be proscribed con-
sistent with First Amendment doctrine and free speech values. See, e.g., Professor Erwin 
Chemerinsky and Expert Panelists Support Bipartisan Federal Bill Against Nonconsensual Pornog-
raphy, CYBER C.R. INITIATIVE (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.cybercivilrights.org/2017 
-cybercrime-symposium [https://perma.cc/3DGT-LUEV]; Neil M. Richards & Danielle Cit-
ron, Regulating Revenge Porn Isn’t Censorship, AL JAZEERA AM. (Feb. 11, 2015), https://america
.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/2/why-regulating-revenge-porn-isnt-censorship.html 
[https://perma.cc/QXJ3-S6X3]; Eugene Volokh, Florida “Revenge Porn” Bill, VOLOKH CON-
SPIRACY (Apr. 10, 2013), https://volokh.com/2013/04/10/florida-revenge-porn-bill [https://
perma.cc/NZZ4-XSXB]; 
436. State v. VanBuren, No. 2016-253, 2018 WL 4177776 (Vt. Aug. 31, 2018). 
437. Id. at *15. 
438. Id. at *7. The court extensively cited the article that Franks and I wrote about the criminaliza-
tion of revenge porn in its findings. An appellate court in Wisconsin similarly upheld its crim-
inal statute. See State v. Culver, 918 N.W.2d 103 (Wis. Ct. App 2018). 
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Now to the question of deep-fake sex videos. Under First Amendment doc-
trine, defamation law provides redress for reputation-harming falsehoods about 
private individuals circulated negligently.
439
 Public officials and public figures 
like Gal Gadot
440
 could sue for defamation if there is clear and convincing evi-
dence of actual malice (that is, the defendant knew the deep-fake sex videos were 
false or recklessly disregarded the possibility that they were false).
441
 
As I explain in my work on deep fakes with Robert Chesney, deliberate, 
harm-causing lies are unprotected under First Amendment doctrine.
442
 Federal 
and state laws, for instance, punish the deliberate impersonation of government 
officials in a manner consistent with First Amendment commitments.
443
 Such 
lies, Helen Norton observes, concern the “source of the speech.”
444
 Lies of this 
kind—that is, of who is actually speaking—can be proscribed because they 
threaten significant harm to listeners who rely on them as a proxy for reliability 
and credibility.
445
 These laws “remain largely uncontroversial as a First Amend-
ment matter in great part because they address real (if often intangible) harm to 
the public as well as to the individual target.”
446
 The regulation of deep-fake sex 
videos concerns whether someone actually engaged in pornography, an objec-
tively verifiable determination.
447
 This lessens concerns that the regulation of 





439. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
440. See supra note 324 and accompanying text. 
441. For an overview of the defamation tort, see CITRON, supra note 12, at 121. Defamation has no 
application to other sexual-privacy invasions because they involve truthful, private intimate 
information, not falsehoods. 
442. See Chesney & Citron, supra note 4 (manuscript at 33) (discussing United States v. Alvarez, 
567 U.S. 709 (2012)). 
443. Helen Norton, Lies to Manipulate, Misappropriate, and Acquire Government Power, in LAW AND 
LIES 143, 165-76 (Austin Sarat ed., 2015). 
444. Id. at 165; see also Marc Jonathan Blitz, Lies, Line Drawing, and (Deep) Fake News, 71 OKLA. L. 
REV. 59, 110 (2018). 
445. Norton, supra note 443, at 168. 
446. Id. at 170-71. 
447. See id. at 187-89 (discussing ways that legislatures can narrowly tailor proscriptions of lies so 
as to survive First Amendment scrutiny). 
448. See id. Helen Norton helpfully talked with me about the First Amendment implications of 
regulating deep-fake sex videos. 
the yale law journal 128:1870  2019 
1938 
Unauthorized recordings in private spaces like bedrooms also raise few con-
cerns for free speech.
449
 As courts have explained in the context of suits against 
the media, no one has the right to break into someone’s home or business to 
gather the news.
450
 Certainly, the First Amendment does not protect perpetra-
tors from laws proscribing video voyeurism, giving them a right to spy on some-
one’s computer, bedroom, or shower.
451
 
Public spaces raise different concerns. Margot Kaminski has explored the nu-
ance in free speech doctrine when laws proscribe unauthorized recording in pub-
lic spaces.
452
 Free speech challenges can be overcome if the privacy interest is 
strong and there is no legitimate public interest in the expression.
453
 Up-skirt 
laws represent just such a scenario: they concern a strong governmental interest 
(the protection of sexual privacy) and the expression at issue (the recording of 
someone’s genitals or underwear) lacks a legitimate public interest. 
2. Shortcomings 
Digital technologies enable sexual-privacy invasions that existing law is ill-
suited to address. Sometimes, law’s inadequacy stems from the fact that it has 
developed in an incremental fashion. At other times, it originates from out-
moded assumptions. Both concerns apply to the regulation of sextortion, deep-
fake sex videos, up-skirt photos, and certain public disclosures of intimate im-
ages. When social conditions change in fundamental ways, law must adapt or 




449. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (suggesting that the illegal recording of electronic 
communications can be regulated consistently with the First Amendment); see also RICHARDS, 
supra note 37, at 60-61. 
450. RICHARDS, supra note 37, at 57-72; see also Neil M. Richards, The Limits of Tort Privacy, 9 J. ON 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 357, 361-65 (2011) (describing the origins of and justifications 
for laws protecting individuals from disclosures of private information). 
451. See Richards, supra note 450, at 382-83 (discussing how such acts satisfy the common law tort 
of intrusion without implicating the First Amendment). 
452. Margot Kaminski, Privacy and the Right to Record, 97 B.U. L. REV. 167, 220-23 (2017). 
453. Id. at 232-35. 
454. Ryan Calo’s scholarship offers an insightful exploration of how new technologies challenge 
law and legal structures. See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. 
REV. 513 (2015). Not all cyberproblems require new legal solutions. As Judge Frank Easter-
brook argued long ago, existing law can tackle many harms caused by digital technologies. 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207. I have 
argued that mainstream torts can be adapted to address certain privacy problems, such as 
leaking databases of sensitive personal information. Citron, supra note 34, at 278-80, 283-94 
(analogizing insecure databases of sensitive personal information to reservoirs at the turn of 
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For sextortion, the criminal law offers a patchwork of tools that are insuffi-
cient when perpetrators target adults.
455
 Different federal and state criminal 
charges have been used to prosecute sextortion, but they produce disparate sen-
tences with “no clear association between prison time meted out and the egre-
giousness of the crime committed.”
456
 The sentence disparity stems from weak 
state laws and the dramatically different ways federal and state law treat minor 
and adult victims.
457
 Under federal law, the sextortion of an adult is usually pros-
ecuted as computer hacking, extortion, or stalking, and such laws carry light 
sentences compared with the child pornography laws that apply when sextortion 
involves minors.
458
 As a Brookings study explains, the “severity of the sen-
tence . . . is simply not directly related to either the number of victims or the de-
pravity of the individual crime.”
459
 
Deep-fake sex videos are another area where current law falls short. No fed-
eral criminal law covers the practice, though a smattering of state statutes might 
apply, as discussed above. The most-recognized privacy torts—intrusion on se-
clusion and public disclosure of private fact—provide no redress for deep-fake 
sex videos.
460
 Creation and dissemination of videos generated from publicly 
available images would not amount to an intrusion on seclusion since no private 
space or activity is intruded upon. Nor would deep-fake sex videos amount to a 
public disclosure of private fact since no truthful, private facts are revealed.
461
 
Another shortcoming involves the recently adopted laws criminalizing non-
consensual pornography. Some such laws are woefully inadequate. Most make 
 
the twentieth century—activity crucial to the economy but also raising significant dangers—
and advocating a Rylands v. Fletcher, [1868] 3 LRE & I. App. (HL) 330 (appeal taken from 
Eng.), strict-liability approach); see also Citron, supra note 24, at 1836-50 (exploring enable-
ment tort, confidentiality law, and strict liability to address privacy problems ill-suited to the 
privacy torts). 
455. Benjamin Wittes et al., Closing the Sextortion Sentencing Gap: A Legislative Proposal, BROOKINGS 
4 (2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/closing-the-sextortion-sentencing-gap-a 
-legislative-proposal [https://perma.cc/227C-R6K7]. 
456. Id. at 2. 
457. Id. at 2-5. 
458. Id. at 5. 
459. Id. at 2. 
460. Chesney & Citron, supra note 4 (manuscript at 36). 
461. The appropriation tort is inapplicable because creators of deep-fake sex videos likely do not 
use people’s faces or bodies for a commercial advantage. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 652C (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRI-
VACY LAW 220 (5th ed. 2015) (explaining that the appropriation tort protects against the com-
mercial exploitation of one’s name or likeness). 
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the practice a misdemeanor, which both discourages law enforcement from pur-
suing investigations as in the Jacobs case
462
 and leads to light sentences or no jail 
time as in the Mathers case.
463
 Another concern is that the laws are overly nar-
row. The Maryland revenge-porn law only applies to intimate images posted on 
the internet, excluding nude imagery sent to colleagues, friends, and family via 
email or text. For Mary Anne Franks and me, this was as unsurprising as it was 
disappointing. Franks has worked closely with most state lawmakers interested 
in criminalizing nonconsensual pornography, yet far too many failed to follow 
her well-crafted proposed model statute.
464
 In Franks’s view, many of the re-
cently adopted state laws criminalizing nonconsensual pornography are so nar-
row that they will do little to combat the problem.
465
 
The legal recourse available to victims of up-skirt photos and disclosures of 
private intimate facts illustrates how cramped notions of privacy leave some in-
vasions of sexual privacy without legal protection. Traditional privacy law fails 
to address certain sexual-privacy invasions because, as Ari Waldman explains, it 
relies on “under-inclusive bright line rules to determine the difference between 
public and private.”
466
 For instance, privacy law presumes that certain spaces—
bedrooms, hotel rooms, and bathrooms—warrant privacy protection.
467
 But 
once people leave those spaces, the presumption flips.
468
 On the “street, or in any 
 
462. See supra notes 297-306 and accompanying text. 
463. See supra notes 316-319 and accompanying text. 
464. Interview with Mary Anne Franks (Sept. 2, 2018). 
465. Id. 
466. WALDMAN, supra note 37, at 72. 
467. See supra notes 450-451 and accompanying text. 
468. See MCGEVERAN, supra note 40, at 105-09; SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 461, at 50-51. This 
presumption extends beyond the privacy torts and criminal law. Under Fourth Amendment 
doctrine, the general assumption is that we have no reasonable expectation of privacy in our 
public travels. See David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. 
L. REV. 62, 85 (2013). Recent Supreme Court decisions have suggested that digital technolo-
gies enabling continuous and indiscriminate surveillance of one’s public travels may amount 
to a search, thus implicating the crucible of Fourth Amendment protection. Id. at 67-68. In 
United States v. Jones, a majority of the Court made that point as to the placement of a GPS 
tracker on the defendant’s car. See 565 U.S. 400, 413-14 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); 
id.at 430-31 (Alito, J., joined by Ginsburg, Breyer & Kagan, JJ., concurring in the judgment). 
In Carpenter v. United States, the Court held that the government’s access to cell-site location 
data, held by a third-party provider, amounted to a search requiring a warrant based on prob-
able cause. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, explained that the Fourth Amend-
ment was implicated because the technology enabled “too permeating police surveillance” and 
enabled the tracking of the “whole of [one’s] physical movements.” 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214, 2219 
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other public place, the plaintiff has no right to be alone.”
469
 This is true of both 
criminal and privacy-tort law. 
Criminal convictions have been struck down in up-skirt cases because the 
defendants took the photos while in public. Let’s return to the case of a Georgia 
man who took a video of a woman up her skirt at a local grocery store.
470
 The 
Georgia statute banned the use of any device, without consent, to photograph or 
record the activities of another occurring in “any private place and out of public 
view.”
471
 The majority reversed the conviction on the grounds that the law failed 
to “reach all of the disturbing conduct that has been made possible by ever-ad-
vancing technology.”
472
 Although the case turned on the legislative meaning of 
“private place,” it implicitly reflected the broader fallacy in legal thinking that 
public spaces and privacy are incompatible. 
The dissent noted that rather than the statute being outpaced by technology, 
it was an overly narrow interpretation of a “private place.”
473
 Sexual privacy is 
not an all-or-nothing proposition. There are degrees and nuances to the sort of 
privacy that society expects.
474
 Even in public, there are boundaries—Robert 
Post calls them “information preserves”—that are integral to individuals and 
warrant respect.
475
 This is so for parts of our bodies, such as the genitalia, anus, 
and female breasts, that we endeavor to conceal in public with shirts, pants, un-
derwear, and bras. 
Nevertheless, both federal and state courts routinely find that plaintiffs have 
no privacy rights in public.
476
 For instance, in Neff v. Time, Inc., a photographer 
 
(2018). In both Jones and Carpenter, five Justices signaled that where digital technologies sig-
nificantly alter the nature of surveillance, the presumption that we have no privacy in public 
may not apply. 
469. Prosser, supra note 422, at 391. Scholars have explored the pitfalls of drawing a sharp line be-
tween what is public and what is private. See, e.g., NISSENBAUM, supra note 37, at 113-125; 
Woodrow Hartzog, The Public Information Fallacy, 99 B.U. L. REV. 459 (2019); Skinner-
Thompson, Performative Privacy, supra note 11; Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks The-
ory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919 (2005). 
470. Gary v. State, 790 S.E.2d 150 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016). 
471. Id. at 152. 
472. Id. at 155. 
473. Id. at 155 (Mercier, J., dissenting). 
474. NISSENBAUM, supra note 37, at 144; SOLOVE, supra note 29, at 50-67. 
475. ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 73 
(1995). 
476. See, e.g., Cefalu v. Globe Newspaper Co., 391 N.E.2d 935 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979). For thought-
ful scholarship on the intrusion tort in up-skirt cases, see Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Pri-
vacy Law Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV. 990 
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captured a photo of the plaintiff cheering at a football game that showed his 
trousers’ fly open and his underwear exposed.
477
 The photo was subsequently 
published in Sports Illustrated. In addition to finding that the photograph was 
newsworthy, the federal district court held that the plaintiff had no expectation 
of privacy because the photograph was “taken at a public event” with the 
“knowledge and implied consent of the subject.”
478
 Similarly, a Texas state court 
found that a high school soccer player had no expectation of privacy (and thus 
no actionable privacy-tort claim) in a photograph of him while his genitalia were 




Despite these cases, plaintiffs can look to Daily Times Democrat v. Graham,
480
 
decided in 1964, for support of the claim that they have a legally protected pri-
vacy interest “up their skirts.” In Graham, the plaintiff took her children to a 
county fair. Her dress was “blown up by the air jets,” and her body “exposed 
from the waist down” except for the “portion covered by her panties.”
481
 A news-
paper photographer snapped a picture and put in on the front page.
482
 The Ala-
bama Supreme Court upheld the disclosure claim because being “involuntarily 
and instantaneously enmeshed in an embarrassing pose” in a “public scene” does 
not dispel one’s privacy interest.
483
 Graham, however, is an outlier. 
Other aspects of traditional privacy law also do not accord with how we ex-
perience sexual-privacy invasions. To sue for public disclosure of private fact, the 
information must be disclosed to a wide audience.
484
 This presumes that there 
 
(1995); and Carlos A. Ball, Privacy, Property, and Public Sex, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 
(2008). 
477. 406 F. Supp. 858, 860 (W.D. Pa. 1976). 
478. Id. at 861. 
479. McNamara v. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 901, 904 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991). 
480. 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964). Clay Calvert wisely describes Flora Bell Graham’s case as the “orig-
inal upskirt” litigation. CLAY CALVERT, VOYEUR NATION: MEDIA, PRIVACY, AND PEERING IN 
MODERN CULTURE 203 (2004). 
481. 162 So. 2d at 476. 
482. Id. 
483. Id. at 478. The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provide support for the Graham 
decision. A comment to the section on the intrusion tort notes that “[e]ven in a public place, 
however, there may be some matters about the plaintiff, such as his underwear or lack of it, 
that are not exhibited to the public gaze; and there may still be an invasion of privacy when 
there is intrusion upon these matters.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (AM. 
LAW INST. 1977). 
484. Courts refuse to recognize disclosure claims if a private fact is not widely publicized. See, e.g., 
Swinton Creek Nursey v. Edisto Farm Credit, 514 S.E.2d 126, 132 (S.C. 1999). As the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts notes, it is “not an invasion of the right to privacy . . . to communicate 
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is little damage when intimate information is divulged to a small group of peo-
ple. But the disclosure to such groups—employers, family, and colleagues—is 
often the most damaging for victims. When Jacobs’s ex-boyfriend revealed her 
nude photos to her employer, her sense of self-worth and confidence was de-
stroyed. 
Consider Bilbrey v. Myers.
485
 There, a Florida court rejected a disclosure claim 
on the grounds that there was no widespread publicity of the private fact. A pas-
tor broadcast the plaintiff’s homosexuality to a church congregation, which in-
cluded his fiancée’s father. The disclosure undermined the man’s ability to con-
struct his sexual identity on his own terms. Even though the pastor did not 
disclose the information online, the damage was profound because the audience 
included the plaintiff’s family members.
486
 The widespread publicity rule does 
not accord with how intimate information is shared and can be exploited to peo-
ple’s detriment. 
Lastly, a crucial shortcoming is the broad immunity afforded to user-gener-
ated content platforms. Having written about § 230 elsewhere, I will not belabor 
the point.
487
 However, it is worth noting that the overbroad interpretation of 
§ 230 has given content platforms a free pass to ignore destructive sexual-privacy 
invasions, to repost illegal material knowingly and deliberately, and to solicit 
sexual-privacy invasions while ensuring that abusers cannot be identified.
488
 The 
overbroad interpretation of § 230 makes life even more difficult for victims. 
For example, Grindr was notified over fifty times that someone was imper-
sonating a man on the app, sharing his nude images, claiming he had rape fan-
tasies, and providing his home address.
489
 Over a thousand strangers came to his 
door demanding sex.
490
 Grindr ignored the man’s complaints and refused to do 
 
a fact concerning a plaintiff’s private life to a single person or to even a small group of people.” 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a. 
485. 91 So. 3d 887 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
486. Victims might be able to sue for intentional infliction of emotional distress because the con-
duct is severe and outrageous and causes severe emotional distress. CITRON, supra note 12, at 
216-18 (exploring intentional infliction of emotional distress in the context of cyberstalking). 
487. Id. at 167-81; Citron, supra note 215, at 114-25; Citron & Wittes, supra note 399; Danielle Citron 
& Quinta Jurecic, Platform Justice: Content Moderation at an Inflection Point, HOOVER INSTITU-
TION (2018), https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/citron-jurecic 
_webreadypdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7T4-X8Y4]. 
488. Citron & Wittes, supra note 399, at 406-14. 
489. Herrick v. Grindr, 306 F. Supp. 3d 579, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
490. Sara Ashley O’Brien, 1,100 Strangers Showed Up at His Home for Sex. He Blames Grindr, CNN 
(Apr. 14, 2017, 1:02 PM ET), https://money.cnn.com/2017/04/14/technology/grindr-lawsuit
/index.html [https://perma.cc/5ABS-RMTZ]. 
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anything about the imposter.
491
 Given the breadth of judicial interpretations of 
§ 230, the law can do little about the app.
492
 
3. Comprehensive Response 
Invasions of sexual privacy should be addressed in a comprehensive man-
ner.
493
 A comprehensive approach would include legislation penalizing sexual-
privacy invasions with enhanced penalties for bias-motivated privacy invasions. 
It would allow individuals to sue certain content platforms. And it would call for 
the privacy torts to evolve so that sexual-privacy invasions can be meaningfully 
redressed. 
Why not, however, continue along the path of adopting specific statutes as 
problems capture lawmakers’ attention? We could pass legislation as specific is-
sues arise. Today, it is sextortion, deep fakes, and up-skirt photos. Tomorrow, 
sexual-privacy invasions may involve robots and drones. States have criminal-
ized nonconsensual porn, often with separate statutes.
494
 Congress is consider-
ing a federal statute to do the same.
495
 
An incremental approach has merit. It enables an assessment of whether a 
particular legislative approach is working and should be extended to other areas. 
But it would require updating as new sexual-privacy invasions arise.
496
 Practi-
cally speaking, it is difficult to capture the interest of lawmakers on any given 
topic. An approach that requires constant updating likely would not be updated 
in a timely manner. 
To be sure, an incremental approach can be precisely the right approach 
when society is wrestling with changing attitudes. Consider efforts to criminal-
ize nonconsensual pornography. Much as the women’s rights movement of the 
1960s and 1970s first had to name domestic violence and workplace sexual har-
assment to capture the public’s attention, advocates and scholars had to educate 
 
491. Herrick, 306 F. Supp. 3d at 593. 
492. See id. at 588-92. 
493. Sextortion may warrant higher penalties than other sexual-privacy invasions. A federal statute 
can consider aggravating factors as sentence enhancements. 
494. Franks, Democratic Surveillance, supra note 46, at 482-83. 
495. See Chris Morris, Revenge Porn Law Could Make It a Federal Crime to Post Explicit Photos With-
out Permission, FORTUNE (Nov. 28, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/11/28/revenge-porn-law 
[https://perma.cc/QA7Z-58GL]. 
496. We have seen law struggle in the related area of stalking and harassment, with states passing 




the public about nonconsensual pornography and the harm it inflicted.
497
 In 
2013, when Mary Anne Franks wrote the first model revenge-porn statute,
498
 and 
in 2014, when we wrote the first law review article on the topic,
499
 a crucial part 
of our task was expressive. We had to convince lawmakers and the public why it 
was not the fault of victims who trusted exes with their nude photos. At the time, 
calling for law to combat sexual-privacy invasions—with revenge porn as an il-
lustration—might not have captured lawmakers’ attention in the way that fram-
ing the issue as revenge porn did. 
Now, however, we are at a pivotal moment. Having convinced lawmakers of 
the seriousness of nonconsensual pornography in just a few short years, we can 
make the case for seeing the constellation of sexual-privacy invasions as a single 
problem. Digital voyeurism, up-skirt photos, sextortion, nonconsensual porn, 
and deep-fake sex videos are all sexual-privacy invasions, and they all should be 
treated and penalized as such. In this moment, we need to make clear that sexual-
privacy invasions undermine equality if they are motivated by bias. 
There is much to be said for making an explicit legislative commitment to 
combat sexual-privacy invasions and to enhance penalties for bias-motivated 
abuse. Law is our teacher.
500
 It shapes attitudes, beliefs, and behavior through 
its messages and lessons.
501
 It educates society about what behavior is harmful 
 
497. That work was undertaken by a group of advocates and scholars. Without My Consent, 
founded by Erica Johnstone and Colette Vogel, was formed to educate the public about laws 
that would enable victims of privacy invasions to sue as Jane or John Does and grew to cover 
nonconsensual pornography. Holly Jacobs cofounded the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative 
(CCRI) with Mary Anne Franks to combat the problem of nonconsensual pornography. They 
named the organization after my article Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 215, which made the case 
for conceptualizing cyberstalking as a civil rights problem. I currently serve as Vice President, 
Secretary, and member of CCRI’s Board of Directors. Mary Anne Franks serves as President 
and Legislative Director of CCRI; Jason Walta serves as CCRI’s Treasurer. Holly Jacobs is a 
member of CCRI’s Board of Directors. 
498. Mary Anne Franks, Why We Need a Federal Criminal Response to Revenge Porn, CONCURRING 
OPINIONS (Feb. 15, 2013), https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/02/why-we-need 
-a-federal-criminal-law-response-to-revenge-porn.html [https://perma.cc/8SR5-VXVW]. 
499. Citron & Franks, supra note 3. 
500. In my book Hate Crimes in Cyberspace and a law review article entitled Law’s Expressive Value 
in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment, I argued that naming and penalizing online stalking 
as a civil rights violation served a crucial expressive purpose. CITRON, supra note 12, at 126-27; 
Citron, supra note 14, at 407-14; see also Citron, supra note 215. 
501. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996); see also 
Citron, supra note 14, at 399. 
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and what behavior is unacceptable.
502
 Legal penalties demonstrate societal in-
tensity around a social value.
503
 Moreover, law serves as a focal point for social 
change.
504
 When public sentiment about specific behavior is unclear, law pro-
vides expressive clarity, channeling shifts in beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors.
505
 
Legislation penalizing sexual-privacy invasions would say that improper ac-
cess to, spying on, and nonconsensual exposure of our naked bodies and sexual 
activities produce a corrosive injury. It would say that publicly exposing a single 
aspect of one’s intimate life does not mean that all aspects are meant for public 
consumption. It would make clear that confidences shared in intimate relation-
ships deserve respect and protection. 
Another benefit of legal reform would be its salutary effect on victims’ en-
gagement.
506
 Comprehensive sexual-privacy legislation would signal broader 
public support for sexual-privacy victims and the value of their sexual expression 
and sexual autonomy. Individuals and groups that previously experienced sex-
ual-privacy violations or abuses—most likely women and minorities—could in-
fer that their expression is valued.
507
 They may therefore be more likely to en-
gage in sexual expression with future intimate partners. 
Penalty enhancements for bias-motivated privacy invasions would also draw 
attention to the structural impact of such abuse. They would make clear that the 
 
502. See CITRON, supra note 12, at 126-29. 
503. See, e.g., Yuval Feldman, Expressive Function of Trade Secret Law: Legality, Cost, Intrinsic Moti-
vation, and Consensus, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 177, 184-85 (2009). 
504. See Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 35, 45-49 (2002). 
505. Id. at 64-65. 
506. See Penney & Citron, supra note 177 (manuscript at 15-19). 
507. Id. (manuscript at 21). For our coauthored work, Jon Penney conducted an original study that 
supports the supposition that law can encourage cyberharassment victims to speak and en-
gage online. The study involved an online survey of over 1,200 American internet users. Id. 
(manuscript at 14). It examined participants’ responses to various hypothetical “regulatory” 
scenarios, including one where the participant learns that the government has enacted a new 
law introducing “tough civil and criminal penalties for posting information or other content 
online, with the intent to harass or intimidate another person.” Id. (manuscript at 14-15). The 
results offered a number of insights, such as that cyberharassment laws would have more sal-
utary than chilling effects on online engagement. For example, 
87% of respondents indicated a cyber harassment law would have “no impact” or 
render them “somewhat” or “much more” likely to “spend time on the internet;” 
62% indicated law would have “no impact” or render them “more likely” to “speak 
or write about certain topics online;” 67% indicated the law would have no impact 
or would render them somewhat or much more likely to share personally created 
content online; and 56% indicated the law would either have no impact or would 
render them more likely to contribute to social networks online. 
Id. (manuscript at 15-16). 
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eradication of subordination is a central legislative goal.
508
 They would teach us 
about “the stigmatization and humiliation [that individuals] endure[] when 
[they] are targeted . . . due to their gender, race, national origin, [and/]or sexual 
orientation.”
509
 They would recognize the way that stigma, especially with re-
gard to sex and sexuality, collaterally impacts the job market for women, 
nonwhites, and sexual minorities.
510
 
a. Legislative Suggestions 
The drafting of a sexual-privacy statute should be informed by First Amend-
ment doctrine, due process concerns, and the goal of encouraging the passage of 
laws that will deter sexual-privacy invasions. Not only does legislation have to 
give fair warning to potential perpetrators—defendants must have clear notice 
of the precise activity that is prohibited—but it must also not be so broad as to 
criminalize or impose civil penalties on innocuous behavior. 
A sexual-privacy statute should have a number of features. It should focus 
on image-based sexual-privacy invasions because images have a lasting impact 
on our memories and, when posted online, can be difficult—or impossible—to 
forget.
511
 It should require proof that the defendant knowingly engaged in, or 
knowingly coerced another person to engage in, the photographing, filming, re-
cording, digital fabrication, or disclosure of “intimate images” of a person whose 
“private area” is exposed or partially exposed, who is engaged in sexually explicit 
conduct or a “sexual act,” or whose nude image is digitally manufactured. It 
should require proof that the person did not consent to the photographing, film-
ing, recording, digital fabrication, or disclosure of the intimate information. It 
 
508. See CITRON, supra note 12, at 126-29. 
509. Id. at 126. 
510. The connection between privacy and equality is at the heart of European data-protection law. 
See ALLEN, supra note 180, at 144-45, 148. As European lawmakers recognized, the genocide of 
six million Jews and six million others was only possible due to the Nazis’ access to personal 
data about people’s religion and race. See EDWIN BLACK, IBM AND THE HOLOCAUST: THE STRA-
TEGIC ALLIANCE BETWEEN NAZI GERMANY AND AMERICA’S MOST POWERFUL CORPORATION 
(2001). 
511. See Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of Truth: Photographic Evidence and the Power of Analogy, 
10 YALE J.L. HUMAN. 1, 1-4 (1998). Thank you to Jennifer Mnookin and Jessica Silbey who 
discussed with me the power of the image. I will take up this theme in my book project on 
sexual privacy. 
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also should require proof that the photographing, filming, recording, digital fab-




Clear and specific definitions of key terms are vital. The definitions in certain 
voyeurism and nonconsensual pornography laws are helpful guides. For in-
stance, Franks’s model nonconsensual-pornography statute provides well-
crafted definitions of terms like “sexual act,” which “includes but is not limited 
to masturbation; genital, anal, or oral sex; sexual penetration with objects; or 
the transfer or transmission of semen upon any part of the depicted person’s 
body.”
513
 The federal Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004 defines “private 
area” as “the naked or undergarment clad genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or fe-
male breast of that individual.”
514
 Any legislation, though, should exempt dis-
closures concerning matters of legitimate public concern.
515
 This would help 
guard against the chilling of protected speech.
516
 
Criminal penalties should be calibrated to the wrongful conduct. As a start, 
sexual-privacy invasions should be treated as felonies, rather than as misde-
meanors.
517
 This would be a change to existing law. For instance, most states 
 
512. For instance, the statute could read, in part: 
Whoever knowingly [using any means affecting interstate or foreign commerce, 
including by computer] engaged in, or knowingly coerced another person to en-
gage in, the photographing, filming, recording, digitally fabrication, or disclosure 
of an intimate image: 
(1) when the person did not consent to the photographing, filming, record-
ing, digital fabrication, or disclosure of intimate information; and 
(2) in circumstances where a reasonable person would have expected privacy 
in the intimate image 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than five (or ten) years, 
or both. 
I include this just by way of suggestion. In this Article, I aim to provide a way to think about 
potential reform rather than providing a specific legislative path. My book project will think 
through this issue with greater care, especially as my work with federal lawmakers evolves. 
The key goal of this Article is to provide a conceptual map for sexual privacy. 
513. Mary Anne Franks, CCRI Model State Law, CYBER C.R. INITIATIVE, https://www 
.cybercivilrights.org/model-state-law [https://perma.cc/YH32-4476]. 
514. 18 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(3) (2018). 
515. See Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 388. 
516. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 459-60 (2011). 
517. Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 366 n.121, 389-90; Franks, “Revenge Porn” Reform, supra note 
46, at 1281, 1278; Kaimipono D. Wenger, Legal Developments in Revenge Porn: An Interview with 





treat sexual-privacy invasions involving nonconsensual porn as misdemean-
ors.
518
 As we have seen, perpetrators like Mathers receive negligible sentences.
519
 
The possibility of significant prison time would be a more effective deterrent, 
and it would have a more powerful expressive impact. 
As noted above, there should be penalty enhancements for bias-motivated 
sexual-privacy invasions. Law should recognize that some circumstances deserve 
higher penalties. Sextortion is particularly harmful and particularly reprehensi-
ble conduct—it may therefore warrant stiffer penalties than other sexual-privacy 
invasions. Legislation should include aggravating circumstances that would en-




Civil penalties should be included as well. Along these lines, the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws recently proposed a stat-
ute providing civil remedies for the authorized disclosure of intimate images.
521
 
The Uniform Civil Remedies for Unauthorized Disclosure of Intimate Images 
Act permits plaintiffs to bring suits under pseudonyms to protect their identities 
and private lives from further harm.
522
 Plaintiffs are allowed to recover economic 
and noneconomic damages for injuries proximately caused by defendants or 
statutory damages not to exceed $10,000 against a defendant.
523
 Punitive dam-
ages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, and injunctive relief are also al-
lowed.
524
 That statute should extend to all sexual-privacy invasions, not just to 
the disclosure of intimate images without consent. 
 
518. 42 States + DC Now Have Revenge Porn Laws, supra note 416; Aaron Minc, Revenge Porn: How 
to Fight Back [50 State Interactive Map], MINC (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.minclaw.com
/fighting-back-revenge-porn [https://perma.cc/6G9E-TXB5] (showing that twenty-eight of 
the fifty states and the District of Columbia treat nonconsensual pornography as a misde-
meanor). 
519. See supra notes 316-319 and accompanying text. 
520. See Richards, supra note 450, at 360-61, 381-82 (suggesting that a hybrid intrusion-disclosure 
tort may help resolve some of the First Amendment problems with the disclosure tort); Rod-
ney A. Smolla, Accounting for the Slow Growth of American Privacy Law, 27 NOVA L. REV. 289, 
302 (2002). 
521. See UNIFORM CIVIL REMEDIES FOR UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF INTIMATE IMAGES ACT § 3 
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018). Franks served as the reporter for this project. 
522. Id. § 5; see also CITRON, supra note 12, at 25 (arguing for recognition of pseudonymous litiga-
tion on behalf of plaintiffs in privacy suits). 
523. UNIFORM CIVIL REMEDIES FOR UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF INTIMATE IMAGES ACT 
§ 6(a)(1)(B). 
524. Id. § 6(a)(3). 
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b. Privacy Torts 
The privacy torts should evolve
525
 even though their practical import may be 
limited if section 230 of the Communications Decency Act stands.
526
 The origin 
of these torts provides interesting insights for a path forward. 
The majority of the early privacy plaintiffs were women whose images had 
been used in advertisements and films without permission or whose nude bodies 
were viewed without consent.
527
 In De May v. Roberts, the first privacy case, a 
doctor went to the plaintiff’s house in the middle of the night to help her deliver 
her child.
528
 The doctor brought a friend with him but never explained that the 
friend was not a medical professional.
529
 The doctor’s friend watched the plain-
tiff as she gave birth.
530
 The court held that the plaintiff had a “right to . . . pri-




Historian Jessica Lake unearthed the stories behind the early privacy cases 
and found that female plaintiffs often used privacy-tort law to object to un-
wanted “optical violation of their exposed bodies.”
532
 Female plaintiffs brought 
suit to “protest” being reduced to “objects of consumption” or shameful “hook-
ers or divorcees.”
533
 Although court decisions tended to attribute privacy redress 
to the preservation of female “modesty” and “reserve,” the plaintiffs themselves 
did not frame their cases that way.
534
 Complaints and other litigation documents 
show that plaintiffs sought to “claim ownership over their life experiences and 




525. See generally CITRON, supra note 12. 
526. As explored above, individuals are unlikely to have the resources required to sue privacy in-
vaders. See supra text accompanying note 398.  
527. LAKE, supra note 15, at 224-25. 
528. 9 N.W. 146, 146 (Mich. 1881). 
529. Id. at 147. 
530. Id. 
531. Id. at 148-49; see also LAKE, supra note 15, at 95. Lake studied primary court documents, in-
cluding affidavits, pleadings, records of testimony, and exhibits of important early cases, in-
cluding Kunz v. Allen, 172 P. 532 (Kan. 1918); Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 
(N.Y. 1902); Feeney v. Young, 181 N.Y.S. 481 (App. Div. 1920); and De May, 9 N.W. 146. See 
LAKE, supra note 15, at 57-69, 94-95, 97-107, 126-27. 
532. LAKE, supra note 15, at 116. 
533. Id. at 90, 106, 118, 221. 
534. Id. at 225. 
535. Id. at 221. 
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This history is instructive. The privacy torts could have evolved in a way that 
provided robust protection of the ability to determine for oneself how much of 
one’s naked body, intimate information, or intimate activities are exposed to oth-
ers, as the earliest plaintiffs imagined. Privacy-tort law might have developed to 
recognize the wrongs of unauthorized surveillance and exposure of the naked 
body and certain intimate activities.
536
 Instead, the privacy torts ossified into 
four torts with cramped meanings, in large part due to William Prosser’s cate-
gorization of them in 1960 and his integration of those categories into the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts.
537
 Courts can and should protect what the early pri-




This goal might enable courts to eliminate some of the rigidity that has pre-
vented privacy torts from tackling disclosures of intimate information to small 
groups of people or intrusions of information preserves in public.
539
 The existing 
privacy torts can be interpreted broadly to protect sexual privacy.
540
 It is crucial 
to recognize that privacy harms can be equally, if not more, profound when pri-
vate facts like nude images are exhibited to a smaller group of people who matter 
to us—for instance, friends, colleagues, or family members—as when they are 
disclosed to the broader public. The rigid publicity rule does not accord with the 
lived reality of victims of sexual-privacy invasions. And, in public, our bodies 
should not be unwittingly and unreasonably exposed to others. Developing tech-
nologies surely will be used in ways that make our bodies vulnerable to surveil-
lance in public. Tort law should treat those developments as wrongful and com-
pensable rather than inevitable and acceptable. 
Another way that the privacy torts could evolve is to redress breaches of con-
fidentiality between intimates. A rich literature supports this view.
541
 This would 
 
536. An important way to think about tort law is as the redress of wrongs, an approach that is both 
pragmatic and morally grounded. See, e.g., JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, 
RECOGNIZING WRONGS (forthcoming 2019). 
537. See Citron, supra note 24, at 1809; Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: 
A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1903 (2010). 
538. Prosser, supra note 422, at 397. Benjamin Zipursky and I are collaborating on a project that 
will flesh out the contours of such a development in privacy-tort law. 
539. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 2007, 2010-11 (2010). 
540. See CITRON, supra note 12, at 142-53. 
541. See, e.g., WALDMAN, supra note 37; Richards & Hartzog, supra note 101; Daniel J. Solove & 
Neil M. Richards, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123 
(2007); Waldman, supra note 112; see also Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First 
Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183 (2016) (attempting to reconcile the tensions between 
information-privacy rights and First Amendment rights through the concept of an “infor-
mation fiduciary”). 
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provide redress for a person whose intimate information—whether the fact of 
gender transition or a nude image—is shared in violation of a promise of confi-
dentiality. 
c. Section 230 Reform 
Enhanced legal liability of perpetrators is insufficient. Content platforms are 
essential to protecting sexual privacy in the digital age. For instance, the call for 
a more regulated internet is no longer considered outlandish.
542
 Congress re-
cently amended § 230 to exempt from immunity platforms that facilitate online 
sex trafficking.
543
 As one of the drafters of § 230 recently acknowledged, the law’s 
safe harbor was meant to incentivize efforts to clean up the internet—not to pro-
vide a free pass for ignoring or encouraging illegality.
544
 
We find ourselves in a very different moment now than we were in five or 
ten years ago, let alone twenty years ago when § 230 was passed. The pressing 
question now is not whether, but to what extent, the safe harbor will be altered. 
That is astounding, to say the least. 
Modest adjustments to § 230 could maintain free and robust online speech 
without extending the safe harbor to bad actors or, more broadly, to platforms 
that do not respond to illegality in a reasonable manner. One possibility sug-
gested by free speech scholar Geoffrey Stone would be to deny the safe harbor to 
bad actors. Specifically, the exemption would apply to online service providers 
that “knowingly and intentionally leave up unambiguously unlawful content 
that clearly creates a serious harm to others.”
545
 This would ensure that bad ac-
tors could not claim immunity if they knowingly and intentionally leave up con-
tent like nonconsensual pornography or up-skirt photos. 
A variant on this theme would deny the immunity to online service providers 
that intentionally solicit or induce illegal behavior or unlawful content. This ap-
proach takes a page from intermediary trademark-liability rules. As Stacey 
 
542. See Citron & Jurecic, supra note 487, at 2. 
543. Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-164, § 3, 
132 Stat. 1253, 1253-54 (2018). 
544. See Alina Selyukh, Section 230: A Key Legal Shield for Facebook, Google Is About to Change, NPR 
(Mar. 21, 2018, 5:11 AM ET), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2018/03/21
/591622450/section-230-a-key-legal-shield-for-facebook-google-is-about-to-change 
[https://perma.cc/2JWB-H6WZ] (citing former Rep. Christopher Cox, R-California). 
545. E-mail from Geoffrey Stone, Professor of Law, Univ. of Chi., to Danielle Citron (Apr. 8, 2018, 
3:38 PM EDT) (on file with author). 
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Dogan urges in that context, the key is the normative values behind the ap-
proach.
546
 Providers that profit from illegality—which surely can be said of sites 
that solicit unlawful content—should not enjoy immunity from liability. Such an 
approach would incentivize these providers to take down harmful, illegal con-
tent, or else risk potential lawsuits. At the same time, other online service pro-
viders would not have a reason broadly to block or filter lawful speech in order 
to preserve the immunity. In other words, the approach targets the harmful con-
duct while providing breathing space for protected expression.
547
 
Yet another approach would be to amend § 230 in a more comprehensive 
manner. As Benjamin Wittes and I have argued, platforms should enjoy immun-
ity from liability only if they can show that their response to unlawful uses of 
their services is reasonable.
548
 The immunity would hinge on the reasonableness 
of providers’ content moderation practices as a whole—rather than whether spe-
cific content was removed or allowed to remain in any single instance. The de-
termination of what constitutes a reasonable standard of care would consider 
differences among online entities. For example, internet service providers and 
social networks with millions of postings a day cannot plausibly respond to com-
plaints of abuse immediately, let alone within a day or two. However, they may 
be able to deploy technologies to detect content previously deemed unlawful. 
The duty of care will evolve as technology improves. 
A reasonable standard of care approach would reduce opportunities for 
abuses without interfering with the further development of a vibrant internet 
and without unintentionally turning innocent platforms into involuntary insur-
ers for those injured through their sites. Approaching the problem as one of set-
ting an appropriate standard of care more readily allows for differentiating 
among various kinds of online actors—for setting different rules for large social 
networks connecting millions of people versus websites designed to facilitate 




546. Stacey Dogan, Principled Standards vs. Boundless Discretion: A Tale of Two Approaches to Inter-
mediary Trademark Liability Online, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 503, 507-08 (2014). 
547. Id. at 508-09. 
548. Citron & Wittes, supra note 399, at 419. A better revision to § 230(c)(1) would read (revised 
language is italicized): “No provider or user of an interactive computer service that takes rea-
sonable steps to prevent or address unlawful uses of its services shall be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by another information content provider in any action 
arising out of the publication of content provided by that information content provider.” Id. 
549. Id. at 423. 
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B. Markets 
Finally, market forces have the potential to play a crucial role in protecting 
sexual privacy. Whether these efforts do more harm than good is worth careful 
study. Information technologies are doubled-edged—they collect, analyze, and 
share personal data even as they afford new opportunities for privacy.
550
 
Consider this example. In the analog age, if people wanted access to racy lit-
erature, they had to go into a store and buy it, revealing their reading habits to 
clerks.
551
 Because it was embarrassing to be seen purchasing such reading mate-
rial, many declined to do so. In the digital age, however, there are no clerks to 




The privacy calculus has morphed, but it is not necessarily a win for individ-
uals. Ordinary members of the public have no idea what we are reading, but 
online behavioral advertisers and e-book sellers certainly do. Indeed, a vast array 
of companies track our online purchases, and information about those purchases 
may end up in many parties’ hands depending upon the sites’ privacy policies.
553
 
David Pozen’s typology of privacy-privacy trade-offs can help us evaluate 
market efforts to protect sexual privacy. One type of privacy trade-off—a “distri-
butional tradeoff”—shifts privacy burdens or benefits from one group in the 
population to another.
554
 A “directional tradeoff” shifts the burdens or benefits 
from groups suffering harm to groups inflicting privacy harm.
555
 A “dynamic 
tradeoff” shifts the privacy risk across time periods.
556
 In a “dimensional 
tradeoff,” the risk is shifted across different privacy interests.
557
 With this typol-
ogy in mind, this Section assesses the impact of emerging trends that are and 
may be invoked to protect sexual privacy. 
 
550. See id. at 412-413; Benjamin Wittes & Jodie C. Liu, The Privacy Paradox: The Privacy Benefits of 
Privacy Threats, BROOKINGS 1-2 (May 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content 
/uploads/2016/06/Wittes-and-Liu_Privacy-paradox_v10.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MXH 
-GXEW]. 
551. Wittes & Liu, supra note 550, at 1-2. 
552. See generally Benjamin Wittes & Emma Kohse, The Privacy Paradox II: Measuring the Privacy 
Benefits of Privacy Threats, BROOKINGS (Jan. 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content
/uploads/2017/01/privacy-paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/C57M-KAVP] (finding that consum-
ers have active privacy interests in dealing with data-collecting companies). 
553. Id. 
554. Pozen, supra note 5, at 229. 
555. Id. 
556. Id. at 229-30. 
557. Id. at 230. 
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1. Facebook Hashes 
Since 2014, Facebook has banned nonconsensual pornography in its terms-
of-service (TOS) agreement. At the start, users would report images as TOS vi-
olations, and the company would react to those requests, removing images 
where appropriate. Yet abusers would routinely repost the material once it had 
been removed, leading to a game of whack-a-mole. 
To address this problem, Facebook has spearheaded technical strategies that 
have garnered different public reactions. Let us consider the effort that has ob-
vious upsides and few downsides for privacy. In April 2017, Facebook announced 
its adoption of hash techniques to prevent the cycle of reposting: users would 
report images as nonconsensual pornography as before, but now, the company’s 
“specially trained representative[s]” would determine if the images violate the 




a mathematical operation that takes a long stream of data of arbitrary 
length, like a video clip or string of DNA, and assigns it a specific value 
of a fixed length, known as a hash. The same files or DNA strings will be 




In essence, hashes are unique digital fingerprints. At Facebook, photo-matching 
technology would block hashed images from reappearing on any of its platforms. 
This strategy is one that Franks, as legislative director of the Cyber Civil Rights 
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Facebook’s program has great promise to mitigate the damage suffered by 
victims of nonconsensual pornography. Preventing the reappearance of noncon-
sensual pornography is a relief to victims, who can rest easy knowing that at least 
on Facebook and its properties, friends, family, and coworkers will not see their 
nude images without their consent.
561
 Storing the hashed images poses little risk 
to privacy—since the images have already been posted without consent and re-
moved, the hashes would be the only remnant of that process and would be dif-
ficult to reverse engineer back to the original image. 
The next step in Facebook’s efforts, however, garnered significant pushback 
from privacy advocates and journalists. In November 2017, the platform an-
nounced a pilot program that would allow victims of nonconsensual porn to 
send it images that they worried might be posted without their consent.
562
 The 
effort grew out of discussions with Facebook about the concerns of women 
whose abusers had threatened to post their nude images online. The question 
posed to Facebook was whether the company could do anything before intimate 
images were posted without their consent to prevent their posting. The hashing 
program was incredibly helpful, but it could not prevent the initial publication. 
There was still harm—mitigated, to be sure, but nevertheless significant. 
Facebook’s technologists and policy leaders have partnered with Australia’s 
e-safety commissioner on a pilot program that lets individuals send in intimate 
photos that they fear will be posted on Facebook without permission.
563
 Users 
first have to notify the e-safety commissioner’s office about the problem.
564
 Once 
the office notifies Facebook, individuals are sent a one-time link they can use to 
send an intimate image to Facebook. Facebook’s operations obtain the image and 
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then hash it to prevent its future posting on the site.
565
 Facebook is planning on 
extending the program to the United States and the United Kingdom. 
The reaction to the proposal was swift, and much of it was negative. Some 
criticism was warranted. Journalists asked why anyone should trust Facebook 
after the Cambridge Analytica fiasco.
566
 Information-security experts noted that 
transmitting intimate images to Facebook entailed security risks.
567
 Civil-liber-




There is indeed risk to sexual privacy—a dynamic one, to use Pozen’s term. 
If Facebook fails to secure the transmission of nude images and does not delete 
those images after hashing them, hackers could later obtain the images and post 
them all over the internet. The image submission process could be attacked by 
phishing schemes that would put intimate images into the hands of criminals.
569
 
All signs, however, do not point in that direction. Facebook is immediately de-
leting the nude images after hashing them, and again, it is difficult to reengineer 
images from hashes. 
The hash program also offers meaningful upsides for sexual privacy. The pi-
lot program is an experiment, one that could end up protecting far more sexual 
privacy than it endangers. Crucially, Facebook safety officials, notably Antigone 
Davis and Karuna Nain, are monitoring the project to ensure that the privacy 
calculus makes sense. Facebook is hosting in-house training sessions with ex-
perts so that staff are attuned to privacy concerns.
570
 In short, these are precisely 
the sort of careful efforts that companies should engage in as they adopt privacy-
enhancing technologies that also carry risks. 
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The Facebook pilot program would be equally available to women and mar-
ginalized communities as to heterosexual white men. Access to Facebook’s prop-
erties is effectively purchased with personal data—thus, wealthy or poor, white 
or nonwhite, male or female, anyone with a Facebook or Instagram account can 
take advantage of it. It is a program worth trying in the United States, one in 
which privacy risks do not outweigh the privacy benefits. 
2. Immutable Life Logs 
The development of hard-to-debunk deep-fake sex videos raises the possi-
bility of a market response that would enable people to have credible alibis. As 
Robert Chesney and I discuss in a project about the national security, privacy, 
and democracy implications of deep fakes, there may soon emerge a service that 
warrants careful study: “[I]mmutable life logs or authentication trails that make 
it possible for a victim of a deep fake to produce a certified alibi credibly proving 
that he or she did not do or say the thing depicted.”
571
 
“From a technical perspective,” we write, “such services will be made possi-
ble by advances in a variety of technologies including wearable tech; encryption; 
remote sensing; data compression, transmission, and storage; and blockchain-
based record-keeping.”
572
 That last element may be important because a vendor 
hoping to provide such services could not succeed without earning a strong rep-
utation for the immutability and comprehensiveness of its data. 
Obviously, not everyone would want such a service even if it could work rea-
sonably effectively as a deep-fake defense mechanism. But some individuals—
such as politicians, celebrities, and others whose fortunes depend to an unusual 
degree on fragile reputations—will have sufficient fear of suffering irreparable 
harm from deep fakes that they may be willing to agree to, and pay for, a service 
that comprehensively tracks and preserves their movements, surrounding visual 
circumstances, and perhaps in-person and electronic communications. (Though 
providers may be reluctant to include audio-recording capacity because “twelve 
states criminalize the interception of electronic communications unless both par-
ties to the communication consent to the interception.”
573
) 
Should we encourage the emergence of such services? We need to examine 
the privacy calculus in total. At issue are dimensional and distributional privacy-
privacy trade-offs. 
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First to the dimensional aspect of the trade-off. Individuals’ privacy and rep-
utations would be protected by giving enormous power over every detail of their 
lives to life-logging companies. There are, however, serious social costs to pri-
vacy should such services emerge and prove popular. Proliferation of compre-
hensive life-logging services would have tremendous spillover effects on privacy 
in general. It risks what has been called the “unraveling of privacy”
574
—the out-
right functional collapse of privacy via social consent despite legal protections 
intended to preserve it. Scott Peppet has warned that as more people relinquish 
their privacy voluntarily, the remaining people who have not done so increas-
ingly risk being subject to the inference that they have something to hide.
575
 This 
dynamic might overcome the reluctance of some holdouts. Worse, the holdouts 
in any event will lose much of their lingering privacy, as they find themselves 
increasingly surrounded by people engaged in life logging. 
The supplier of life-logging services would have extraordinary power over 
people using their services.
576
 The personal data amassed would be a treasure 
trove for advertisers interested in exploiting our weaknesses and desires. Paul 
Ohm has presciently called a variant of this possibility a “database of ruin.”
577
 
Some perils could be tempered by clear, enforceable commitments of confiden-
tiality. Others, including the potential for data breach, would be difficult to elim-
inate. 
To be sure, life logging would have its upside in terms of identifying deep-
fake sex videos and all other manners of using video to fabricate the past. But 
this upside would not be enjoyed by all. At least in its initial adoption, it would 
only be practically available to the wealthy and powerful. Herein lies the distri-
butional privacy-privacy trade-off. The privacy upsides of such services would 
not be available to the average person whose privacy is invaded. Such services 
would likely be expensive and thus out of the reach of many women and mar-
ginalized individuals. And in any event, it would be ineffective to address jobs 
that victims never know that they do not get because a deep-fake sex video ap-
peared in a search of their names. 
A world with widespread life logging of this kind might produce more ben-
efits than costs (particularly if there is legislation well-tailored to regulate access 
to such a new state of affairs). But it might not. Enterprising businesses may 
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seek to meet the pressing demand to counter deep fakes in this way, but it does 
not follow that society should welcome—or wholly accept—that development. 
Careful reflection is essential now, before either deep fakes or responsive services 
get too far ahead of us. 
* * * 
Of course, these are just two examples of market responses to sexual-privacy 
invasions. More are surely on the horizon.
578
 That is a good thing. Law cannot 
deter and redress all manner of sexual-privacy invasions. Market solutions are 
crucial for reform efforts. As market solutions emerge, however, we must not 
adopt them without a careful assessment of the privacy risks and trade-offs. 
conclusion 
Sexual privacy is undergoing transformative change in our digital age. Net-
worked tools create new opportunities for sexual expression and sexual privacy. 
Today’s intimate partners routinely share nude images to foster intimacy, the 
same reason people once sent hand-written love letters. Encrypted communica-
tions are far less vulnerable to theft than letters in the mailbox are. 
At the same time, networked tools can be easily and cheaply exploited to un-
dermine sexual expression and sexual privacy. The denial of sexual privacy is 
closely tied to subordination and discrimination. Digital voyeurism, up-skirt 
photos, sextortion, nonconsensual porn, and deep-fake sex videos are all sexual-
privacy invasions—and marginalized and subordinated communities most often 
shoulder the abuse. 
Sexual privacy deserves special recognition and protection given its founda-
tional relationship with sexual autonomy, intimacy, and equal opportunity. Law 
and markets can secure sexual privacy. We must leverage both with care and im-
agination for the good of individuals, groups, and society. 
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